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Vanished Planes 
Robert M. Jarvis*
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of aviation is marked by aircraft that have disappeared 
without a trace.1 Such flights leave a host of legal issues in their wake, and 
        *   Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University (jarvisb@nsu.law.nova.edu). 
1  It generally is agreed that Matías Pérez was the first person in history to vanish in flight—on 
June 29, 1856, he took off from Havana, Cuba, in a hot air balloon and was never seen again. Even today, 
when someone or something disappears, it is common for locals to invoke Pérez’s name. See Emma 
Álvarez-Tabío Albo, The City in Midair, in HAVANA BEYOND THE RUINS: CULTURAL MAPPINGS AFTER
1989, at 149, 167 (Anke Birkenmaier & Esther Vhitfield eds., Eric Felipe-Barkin trans., 2011) (explaining 
that Pérez “is immortalized in the colloquial phrase ‘Voló como Matías Pérez’ (He flew [away] like Matías 
Pérez)”).
In the 159 years since Pérez’s misadventure, many other individuals have suffered the same fate, 
including, most famously, aviation pioneer Amelia Earhart (1937); band leader Glenn Miller (1944); and 
U.S. Representative Hale Boggs (1972). Likewise, certain missing planes have achieved their own 
notoriety, such as the U.S. Navy bombers of Flight 19 (“The Lost Patrol”) (1945); N844AA (2003) (the 
former American Airlines 727 that disappeared after taking off from Quatro de Fevereiro Airport in 
Luanda, Angola); and, of course, Malaysia Airlines’ Flight 370 (2014). Other episodes that have captured 
the public’s imagination include British South American Airways’ impossible run of bad luck (1947-49) 
(the meaning of the Star Dust’s frantic last transmission—“STENDEC”—continues to be the source of 
much speculation, while the loss of the Star Ariel and the Star Tiger figure prominently in “Bermuda 
Triangle” lore); the “Kinross Affair” (1953) (involving the disappearance of U.S. Air Force Lieutenant 
Felix Moncla while chasing what some believe was an alien spaceship); and “D. B. Cooper” (1971) (the 
never found, and still-unidentified, hijacker who jumped out of a Northwest Orient airliner with $200,000 
in ransom money). For a further discussion, see, e.g., Mellon v. Int’l Group for Historic Aircraft Recovery, 
No. 14-8062, 2015 WL 3389859 (10th Cir. May 27, 2015) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that the 
defendant was refusing to reveal the location of Amelia Earhart’s plane in order to not jeopardize its 
fundraising activities); Bolam v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 382 N.Y.S.2d 772 (App. Div. 1976) (defamation suit 
brought by a woman against the publisher of a book that claimed she was Amelia Earhart); C.R. RYDER,
MIDNIGHT GHOSTS: AIRCRAFT THAT DISAPPEARED AND WERE NEVER FOUND (2014); Patrick Weidinger, 
Top 10 People Who Vanished in Airplanes, LISTVERSE, Mar. 14, 2011, http://listverse.com/2011/03/14/
top-10-people-who-vanished-in-airplanes/; List of Aerial Disappearances, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aerial_disappearances. See also ASN Records Over 
80 Aircraft Missing Since 1948, AVIATION SAFETY NETWORK, Mar. 18, 2014, http://news.aviation-
safety.net/2014/03/18/asn-records-over-80-aircraft-missing-since-1948/ (reporting “that at least 88 
passenger, corporate, cargo, and military transport aircraft [have gone] missing without a trace since 
1948”).
Not surprisingly, the foregoing incidents have inspired numerous movies (e.g., Jodie Foster’s Flightplan
(Touchstone Pictures 2005)); novels (e.g., Stephen King’s The Langoliers (1990)); and television shows 
(e.g., Lost (ABC television broadcast 2004-10)). They also occasionally have provided fodder for judicial 
humor. See, e.g., Centurion Capital Corp. v. Guarino, 951 N.Y.S.2d 85, No. 11117/05, 2012 WL 1543286, 
at *6 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Apr. 30, 2012) (“The court can posit several possibilities for [counsel’s 
disappearance]; such as they moved their law office to Brigadoon, Scotland and they will reappear in a 
hundred years; or the entire firm went on a cruise in the Bermuda Triangle; or perhaps they stowed away 
on Amelia Earhart’s plane.”); Arzumamyants v. Fragetti, 862 N.Y.S.2d 806, No. 300078/06, 2008 WL 
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have generated dozens of reported U.S. cases. These decisions, which are 
discussed below,2 can be grouped into six categories: causation; choice of 
law/forum; statutes of limitation; claims; judgments; and taxes.3
II. CAUSATION
When a plane disappears, the first question always is: why?4 Possible 
explanations include government malfeasance, military operations, criminal 
activity, weather, and pilot error. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur also is an 
option. 
2115277, at *4 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Apr. 17, 2008) (“Because neither party provided the court with a copy of 
the title report, the exact status of this property must remain a mystery, along with what happened to 
Amelia Earhart.”). 
2  Except as otherwise indicated, the facts and procedural history of each case appearing in this 
survey are taken from the court’s opinion. 
3  Omitted from this survey are cases in which a plane went missing but later was found. See, e.g.,
Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993) 
(wreckage located after eight years); Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968) (wreckage located after one day); In re Air Crash Disaster Over Makassar 
Strait, Sulawesi, No. 09-CV-3805, 2011 WL 91037 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2011) (wreckage located after nine 
days); Collins v. Big Four Paving, Inc., 423 P.2d 418 (N.M. 1967) (wreckage located after three months); 
Sam v. Okanogan Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 148 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (wreckage located after 
four months); Wells v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 804 P.2d 333 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (wreckage located after 15 
months); Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Waldrep, 400 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (wreckage located 
after several days); Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., 355 N.E.2d 686 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (wreckage located 
after two years); In re Reynolds’s Estate, 180 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sur. Ct. 1958) (wreckage located after five 
months). See also United States v. Reed, Nos. 88-10049-01, 88-10049-02, 1990 WL 66043 (D. Kan. Apr. 
24, 1990) (missing airplane reappeared after four years, during which time it may have been used by the 
government to carry out illegal activities in Central America); HMS Aviation v. Layale Enters., S.A., 149 
S.W.3d 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (727 that disappeared from an airport in Jordan discovered five years 
later in Texas). 
Similarly, this survey does not include cases in which human remains disappeared during a flight. See,
e.g., Coughlin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 847 F.2d 1432, 1433 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Mrs. Coughlin’s 
baggage, which contained the cremated remains of her husband, was lost by Trans World Airlines[.]”); 
Simo Noboa v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de España, 383 F. Supp. 2d 323, 324 (D.P.R. 2005) (“MR. ALOMAR 
testified in his deposition that he placed the box in Compartment No. 5 of an IBERIA Boeing 747 aircraft 
bound to the Dominican Republic. The ashes were lost and have never been found.”). 
4  Seeking to capitalize on this fact, a Chicago law firm filed discovery petitions directed at Boeing 
and Malaysia Airlines within days of Flight 370 disappearing in March 2014. In two sharply-worded 
orders, the Illinois Circuit Court, per Judge Flanagan, dismissed the petitions and warned the firm it would 
be severely punished for any further publicity stunts. See Fatt v. Boeing Co., No. 14-L-3555, 2014 WL 
1303097 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 2014), rev’d, No. 1-14-1108, 2014 WL 6686651 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 26, 
2014), and Siregar v. Boeing Co., No. 14-L-3408, 2014 WL 1303096 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 2014). An 
ethics complaint, based on the Siregar petition and alleging a violation of the rules against frivolous 
pleading, subsequently was filed against one of the firm’s partners. See Complaint, In the Matter of 
Monica E. Ribbeck, Ill. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n (No. 6225920) (filed July 31, 2014), 
https://www.iardc.org/14PR0092CM.html, and Answer, In the Matter of Monica E. Ribbeck, Ill. Att’y 
Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n (No. 6225920) (filed Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.iardc.org/
ANS14PR0092.pdf. For a further discussion, see James B. Danford, Jr., Note, An Airliner and Perhaps a 
Lawyer’s License Disappear: How a Lawyer’s Hasty Actions May Give Them a Long Time to Contemplate 
Their Decisions, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 487 (2015). 
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A.  Government Malfeasance 
In Sullivan v. Central Intelligence Agency,5 the plaintiff filed multiple 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)6 requests to learn more about her father, 
who disappeared in a twin-engine Beechcraft during a 1963 trip from Mexico 
to Honduras. According to the plaintiff, the flight’s real purpose was to drop 
propaganda materials over Cuba. 
After searching its records, the government reported it had no 
responsive, non-privileged documents, a claim the district court found 
credible after an in camera review. On appeal, the First Circuit, per Judge 
Selya, affirmed: 
Although we sympathize with appellant’s desire to learn the details of 
her father’s fate, she, like all other litigants, must abide by the rules. 
Congress crafted the CIA Information Act to strike a balance between 
public disclosure and an effective intelligence apparatus. Our role is not 
to reassess the relative interests . . . or to yield whenever human 
sympathies are engaged, but simply to apply the law as Congress wrote 
it. Given the generality of appellant’s request and the stringent standard 
of confidentiality contained in the Information Act, the district court 
appropriately granted summary judgment in the government’s favor. 
Further, as we have explained, the freshly minted JFK Act claim 
provides no principled basis for a remand and, thus, no detour around 
the ruling below.7
In Whitaker v. Central Intelligence Agency,8 the plaintiff similarly filed 
numerous FOIA requests to discover information about his father’s 
disappearance during a 1980 DC-3 flight from Spain to Germany. According 
to the plaintiff, the plane may have been part of a covert government 
mission.9
When his requests were met with bureaucratic stonewalling, the plaintiff 
brought a federal lawsuit in the District of Columbia. In a lengthy opinion, 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly accepted the U.S. Department of Defense’s explanation 
that it had no records, but ordered both the Central Intelligence Agency and 
the U.S. Department of State to recheck their files and warned them not to 
turn a blind eye to obviously relevant information: 
Although Plaintiff’s [first FOIA] request referred to his father by name 
5  992 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1993). 
6  5 U.S.C. § 552. 
7 Sullivan, 992 F.2d at 1256. 
8  31 F. Supp. 3d 23 (D.D.C. 2014). 
9  The Dutch aviation photographer Ruud Leeuw has created a web page about Whitaker’s claims. 
See Ruud Leeuw, The Search for Douglas DC-3 ECT-025, http://www.ruudleeuw.com/search126.htm. 
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as one of the plane’s pilots, the request also referred specifically to a co-
pilot on board the plane. The co-pilot was admittedly unnamed, but the 
request nevertheless identified a concrete second occupant of the plane, 
as opposed to merely a potential or hypothetical additional occupant . . . . 
Accordingly, upon learning from its search for documents related to 
Harold Whitaker that the co-pilot referenced in the request was 
Lawrence Eckmann, the State Department . . . should have followed up 
on the lead . . . .10
In Valentine v. United States,11 a Beechcraft Queen Air 65-B80 went 
missing during a 1982 flight from Florida to the Bahamas. The pilot’s wife 
subsequently sued the government, claiming that it was slow in starting its 
rescue efforts. In dismissing the lawsuit, Judge Spellman of the Southern 
District of Florida noted: 
The Coast Guard launched its search approximately twenty-four hours 
after the plane went down. By that time, the occupants had either 
drowned from fatigue, exposure or succumbed to the dangers of the 
shark infested waters. 
The Court finds that with such a myriad of variables present, any attempt 
to determine what actually happened is speculation at best. Looking at 
the varying testimony regarding factors such as the weather, sea 
conditions, shark infestation, possible injuries, time constraints, damage 
to the safety equipment, the possibility of a submerged crash, and a host 
of other possibilities, it is simply impossible for the Court to find that 
the government’s erroneous communication to Nassau Flight Service 
was even a contributing factor in the ultimate fate of James Valentine, 
much less the proximate cause of his demise.12
In Mooney v. United States,13 Judge Costantino of the Eastern District 
of New York faced facts similar to those in Valentine but came to a different 
conclusion. A Grumman airplane disappeared during a 1982 flight from New 
York to Massachusetts. When the administrator of the passenger’s estate sued 
the government, it moved to dismiss. In denying the motion, Judge 
Costantino wrote: 
The government argues that the plaintiff cannot establish that the 
decedent survived the plane crash, and thus cannot establish that FAA 
negligence was in any way the proximate cause of Raymond Mooney’s 
10 Whitaker, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 45 (emphasis in original). Five months later, the case was dismissed 
with prejudice when the government renewed its motion for summary judgment and Whitaker offered no 
opposition. See Whitaker v. Central Intelligence Agency, 64 F. Supp. 3d 55 (D.D.C. 2014). 
11  630 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
12 Id. at 1131. 
13  No. CV-84-4827, 1987 WL 9683 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1987). 
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death. The speciousness of this argument is apparent, and further 
discussion of this contention would be superfluous. 
The government also contends that because plaintiff cannot prove that 
the decedent in fact survived the crash and that but for FAA negligence 
would have been rescued, the plaintiff has failed to stake a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. The government’s argument, however, fails 
to recognize the entirety of the plaintiff’s complaint. Although the 
plaintiff asserts that the defendant’s negligence in monitoring the flight 
prevented the initiation of immediate search procedures, the plaintiff 
also asserts that the monitoring of the aircraft was conducted in a 
negligent manner, thus causing or contributing to the crash itself, and 
therefore, the loss of the decedent’s life . . . . 
Plaintiff has produced expert opinions and data that point to a possibility 
that a timely air/sea rescue could have saved the life of the deceased. 
Thus, it appears that the government’s motion is at odds with the well 
settled rule that a complaint is not subject to dismissal unless plaintiff 
cannot prevail under any state of facts which might be proved in support 
thereof.14
B.  Military Operations15
In In re Hansen’s Estate,16 a U.S. Army pilot made a will dated 
September 22, 1943, that left $1 to his wife and the remainder of his estate to 
his daughter. On March 13, 1944, his bomber disappeared in heavy weather 
while on a mission over New Guinea. On December 28, 1944, his wife 
remarried. On January 27, 1946, the Army changed his status from missing 
in action (MIA) to presumed dead and paid his estate $4,716.29. The trial 
court treated this money as community property and, after giving $1 to the 
wife, split the remainder between her and the daughter. 
In a detailed opinion, the California District Court of Appeal, per 
Presiding Justice Shinn, reversed and awarded the entire amount (less $1) to 
the daughter. It also rejected the wife’s argument that death had occurred on 
January 27, 1946: 
On the appeal of Doris Toomey she contends there was no evidence to 
support the finding that decedent’s death occurred March 13, 1944. This 
14 Id. at *1-2. The pilot’s estate also sued the government, but was considerably less successful. 
See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. 
15  The military’s procedures for declaring an aviator who fails to return from a flight either “dead” 
or “presumed dead” are described in detail in Crone v. United States, 538 F.2d 875 (Ct. Cl.), modified on 
reh’g, 210 Ct. Cl. 748 (1976). See also Townsend v. Carter, 476 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Tex. 1979); In re
Wood’s Estate, 62 A.2d 883 (N.J. Orphans’ Ct. 1946); Pamela M. Stahl, The New Law on Department of 
Defense Personnel Missing as a Result of Hostile Action, 152 MIL. L. REV. 75 (1996). 
16  205 P.2d 686 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949). 
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contention cannot prevail . . . . [T]he parties on the appeal agree that the 
facts are as stated in [various] communications [received from the 
government listing the date of death as March 13, 1944,] and they, no 
doubt, had the same understanding at the trial. Assuming, however, as 
the parties do, that this correspondence constituted the only evidence 
that was before the court, the finding that death occurred March 13, 
1944, is, in our opinion, well supported.17
In Finrow v. West,18 a U.S. Navy pilot disappeared during a 1944 attack 
on an enemy carrier task force.19 Five months earlier, a court in Spokane, 
Washington had annulled his marriage to the plaintiff. In 1994 (i.e., 50 years 
later), the plaintiff, claiming to be the surviving spouse of a veteran, sought 
government death benefits. In her application, she explained her mother-in-
law had fraudulently obtained the annulment at a time when the plaintiff was 
pregnant and lacked the money to travel from Rhode Island to Washington 
to contest it. 
The Veterans Administration’s Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the 
plaintiff’s request. Summarily affirming the Board’s decision, the U.S. Court 
of Veterans Appeals, per Judge Holdaway, observed: 
The appellant claims that the annulment was obtained through 
fraudulent action by the veteran’s mother without the veteran’s 
knowledge . . . . However, as the Board pointed out, the veteran had 
informed the Navy personnel department that he was indeed seeking an 
annulment of his marriage. It also appears that the appellant has alleged 
that the annulment decree was obtained in violation of the Due Process 
Clause in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, this 
Court has no jurisdiction to disturb an annulment decree issued by the 
State of Washington . . . . The Court holds that the Board’s decision has 
a plausible basis in the record and must be affirmed.20
In In re Jacobsen’s Estate,21 a U.S. Navy lieutenant, his wife, and their 
two-year-old twins (Caryl and Craig) were passengers aboard an R7V-1 
Super Constellation that disappeared during a 1954 flight that departed from 
Maryland.22 To gain access to Caryl’s only asset—a $2,700 life insurance 
17 Id. at 687-88. 
18  16 Vet. App. 289, No. 97-1605, 1998 WL 834833 (Ct. Vet. App. Oct. 28, 1998), appeal
dismissed, 215 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
19  The court’s opinion does not say where the attack took place. 
20 Finrow, 1998 WL 834833, at *2. 
21  143 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sur. Ct. 1955). 
22  The court’s opinion does not indicate where the plane was headed. Other sources, however, 
report its destination as Port Lyautey, Morocco, after a refueling stop in the Azores. See, e.g., Accident
Description, AVIATION SAFETY NETWORK, http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19541030-
0.
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policy—her paternal grandfather petitioned for letters of administration. In 
granting his request, Surrogate Moss of King’s County (Brooklyn) accepted 
Caryl’s naval death certificate as conclusive proof that she was dead: 
The “Missing Persons Act” relates to persons within the armed forces 
as well as to dependents. In fact the word “dependent” is specifically 
defined as follows: 
“(c) the term ‘dependent’ as used in this Act (sections 1001-1016 
of this Appendix) includes a lawful wife [and an] unmarried child 
under twenty-one years of age. It includes also a dependent mother, 
father, or unmarried dependent stepchild or adopted child under 
twenty-one years of age, or such dependent as has been designated 
in official records, or an individual determined to be dependent by 
the head of the department concerned, or subordinate designated 
by him[.]” 
Under the provisions of Section 1009, Title 50 U.S. Code Ann., as 
amended, the head of the department concerned, or such subordinate as 
he may designate, has the authority to make all determinations necessary 
in the administration of the Act. Such determinations are conclusive “as 
to death or finding of death” and “as to any essential date” of death. In 
the opinion of the Court, the Act permits determinations to be made in 
respect of dependents of persons within the armed services. Under the 
aforesaid definition of “dependents,” the two twin children, one of 
whom was Caryl Leigh Jacobsen the decedent herein, are the 
dependents of Lieutenant Jacobsen and any determinations with respect 
to them or either of them are properly within the contemplation of the 
Missing Persons Act as to the conclusiveness of the determination of 
death.23
In Valley Forge Life Insurance Co. v. Republic National Life Insurance 
Co.,24 a U.S. Navy navigator disappeared in 1967 while engaged in a combat 
mission over Viet Nam. In 1976, the Navy changed his status from MIA to 
killed in action (KIA). Prior to his disappearance, he had taken out a life 
insurance policy with the plaintiff. It, in turn, had entered into a reinsurance 
agreement with the defendant that ran from 1965 to 1967. After paying on 
the policy, the plaintiff sought reimbursement from the defendant. Relying 
on the 1976 change of status, the defendant rejected the plaintiff’s demand as 
being outside the agreement’s coverage period. 
The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant. On appeal, 
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, per Chief Justice Guittard, reversed: 
23 Jacobsen’s Estate, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 434. 
24  579 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). 
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The certificate by the Navy Department shows only that February 24, 
1976, is the date on which the insured’s status was changed on the 
department’s records from “missing in action” to “presumed killed in 
action.” In itself, the certificate does not tend logically to establish the 
date of death . . . . 
Although the opposing evidence here may fall short of direct eye-
witness testimony, we hold that it is sufficient to rebut the presumption 
and to raise a counter-presumption that the insured died in 1967. The 
circumstances of his disappearance, as established by the stipulation, 
provide circumstantial evidence that he died when his plane was shot 
down over North Viet [N]am. Proof of the perilous circumstances in 
which he was last seen raises a counter-presumption, which serves to 
overcome the presumption established by the certificate, and thus to cast 
on [the reinsurer] Republic the burden to produce evidence []tending to 
prove that he survived that peril. See 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2493 
(3rd ed. 1940). Since, by the terms of the stipulation, no other evidence 
is available, judgment should be rendered accordingly.25
In Ward v. United States,26 a U.S. Air Force captain disappeared during 
a 1969 combat mission over Southeast Asia. In 1972, his wife remarried. In 
1978, the government changed his status from MIA to KIA. By this time, the 
decedent’s back pay had reached $131,223.18, an amount claimed by both 
his wife and his mother. 
Citing the wife’s 1972 remarriage, the trial judge awarded the money to 
the mother. On appeal, the Court of Claims, per Judge Nichols, reversed: 
[W]e reject as irrelevant the finding that third-party plaintiff was not the 
wife or widow of Captain Ward on June 20, 1978. Third-party plaintiff 
is entitled to . . . Captain Ward’s pay and allowances because the 
deceased expressly designated her by name as the beneficiary [on his 
emergency paperwork] and not because of her status as his wife or 
widow. Captain Ward’s designation is not limited by the remarriage 
whether subsequent or prior to the date of death. It is not necessary that 
a beneficiary be a dependent of the deceased here.27
In Darr v. Carter,28 the plaintiff’s husband was a U.S. Air Force captain 
who disappeared after his B-52 was hit by missile fire during a 1972 bombing 
run over North Viet Nam. In 1979, the government sought to change his 
classification from MIA to deceased. The plaintiff sued to enjoin the change, 
but the trial court dismissed her complaint as premature. On appeal, the 
25 Id. at 277-78. 
26  646 F.2d 474 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
27 Id. at 479. 
28  487 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Ark. 1980), aff’d, 640 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1981). 
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Eighth Circuit, per Judge Arnold, agreed: 
Our conclusion might be different if the Air Force were acting in clear 
excess of authority, or if the status-review procedure were 
unconstitutional on its face. Neither statement can be made here. Mrs. 
Darr does claim she was not allowed to present all the evidence she 
deems relevant . . . . But what this claim really amounts to, in the 
circumstances of this case, is an assertion that the status-review hearing 
should have been postponed until the Air Force produced a mass of 
additional documentation not shown to have any relation to the Darr 
case in particular. We do not hold that Mrs. Darr has no right to this 
information. We do hold that whether she has such a right should be 
decided, in the first instance, by the Status Review Board and the 
Secretary of the Air Force, with review in the courts only if the 
Secretary’s final determination of Captain Darr’s status is unfavorable. 
This is not a case where the right claimed must be judicially considered 
now if it is ever to be adjudicated by a court. A decent respect for the 
Air Force’s procedures, and an awareness of the need to avoid 
unnecessary burdens on the courts, alike counsel that we not intervene 
at this stage of the proceedings.29
A short time later, a case with facts identical to Darr reached the Fifth 
Circuit. In Lewis v. Reagan,30 the plaintiff tried to stop the government from 
changing her husband’s classification from MIA to KIA. While serving as a 
colonel in the U.S. Air Force, he had disappeared during a 1965 flight over 
Laos. Finding that he almost certainly was a war casualty, the panel, in a per
curiam decision, affirmed the trial court’s refusal to halt the reclassification: 
The Status Review Board in the present case has recommended that the 
status of Colonel Lewis be changed from Missing in Action to Killed in 
Action . . . . The case is thus in precisely the same posture as Darr v. 
Carter, 640 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1981) . . . . The reasoning of the court in 
Darr is persuasive, and we adopt it here.31
C.  Criminal Activity 
In National Insurance Underwriters v. Melbourne Airways and Air 
College, Inc.,32 a plane’s owner filed an insurance claim after its plane 
disappeared during a flight from Florida to the Bahamas.33 Believing that the 
owner’s employee had made off with the plane, the insurer refused to pay 
29 Darr, 640 F.2d at 166 (footnote omitted). 
30  660 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1981). 
31 Id. at 126-27. 
32  210 So. 2d 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 219 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1968). 
33  The court’s opinion does not indicate when the plane went missing. 
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based on the policy’s conversion clause. Finding instead that the loss came 
within the policy’s criminal activity clause, the jury sided with the owner. 
The Florida District Court of Appeal, per Judge Hendry, agreed: 
Melbourne Airways chartered the aircraft, with a pilot who was an 
employee of the corporation, to a third party for a trip to the Bahama 
Islands. It appears that the aircraft was lost while being used by the pilot 
and the charter passengers to drop leaflets over the island of Cuba, 
which was done without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff . . . . 
The basis of appellant’s objection is that no “theft” has occurred, by 
reason of the fact that the pilot was one “in lawful possession” of the 
aircraft within the meaning of the policy terms. In holding the opposite, 
we rely upon the case of Firemans Fund Ins. Co. of San Francisco, Cal. 
v. Boyd, Fla. 1950, 45 So. 2d 499. The facts of the Boyd case are nearly 
identical, the difference being that the item “stolen” was a truck. In 
ruling that the plaintiff therein could collect from the insurer, the Florida 
Supreme Court stated, at page 501: “The truck came into his (the 
employee) custody by virtue of his employment by plaintiff as a truck 
driver, and he had not that possession, nor that contractual obligation 
with respect to the thing bailed characteristic of a bailment.” 
We are of the opinion that the instruction as given comports 
substantially with the facts of the case and with the law as set out in the 
Boyd decision, supra.34
In Gonzalez v. La Concorde Compagnie D’Assurances,35 the plaintiff’s 
Cessna 310 vanished, with the most likely explanation being theft.36 When 
the plaintiff put in a claim with his insurer, it declined to pay on the ground 
that the plaintiff was not, as stated in the policy documents, the plane’s sole 
owner. At trial, the district court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
without giving the insurer a chance to defend itself. On appeal, the First 
Circuit, per Judge Bownes, reversed and remanded: 
Appellee’s counsel suggested at oral argument that the order for a 
directed verdict should be viewed as one granting summary judgment 
for plaintiff. No such motion was ever made or mentioned in the court 
below, and, even if we assume that it was, the fact is that only the 
plaintiff was given an opportunity to present evidence. Defendant had 
no opportunity by way of affidavit or otherwise to set forth any facts. 
Appellee’s counsel forgot, as he obviously did at the trial, that our 
adversary system requires that both sides be given an opportunity to be 
heard. It is not the label that is important, but the principle which is 
34 Melbourne Airways, 210 So. 2d at 268-69. 
35  601 F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1979). 
36  The court’s opinion does not provide any other information about the plane’s disappearance. 
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central to our whole system of jurisprudence. 
While this case may ultimately prove to be, as the court below 
prematurely declared, “the clearest case I have ever[] heard in my life,” 
we must remand.37
In Aero International, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.,38 a 
Cessna vanished during a 1980 flight from Haiti to Aruba. When the plane’s 
owner and mortgagee sought compensation, the insurer refused to pay. At 
trial, the plaintiffs argued the plane had been lost at sea; the defendant insisted 
the pilot had absconded with the aircraft. After the jury sided with the 
plaintiffs, the defendant unsuccessfully moved to set aside the verdict. On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit, per Judge Gee, affirmed: 
U.S. Fire’s final asserted basis for a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. 
is that the policy excludes coverage for any loss due to conversion by 
one in possession of the aircraft. As evidence of conversion, U.S. Fire 
points to the facts that Van Oostrum had not paid Aero the August 1980 
rental charge and that, prior to filing suit, Aero filed criminal charges 
against Van Oostrum for embezzlement by contract. However, Aero’s 
representative testified that the criminal charges were filed because 
otherwise no police investigation could proceed. The record also shows 
that the aircraft disappeared in August 1980, that rental payments had 
been made through July 1980, and that Van Oostrum had paid the first 
and last month’s rental payments in advance. From this evidence, the 
jury could reasonably conclude that the aircraft was not converted by 
Van Oostrum but instead was lost at sea. 
The evidence in this case does not overwhelmingly support either party. 
Perhaps we would have drawn different inferences from some of the 
facts than did the jury, but that is not our task. There was enough 
evidence to support the verdict and the district court did not err in 
refusing to take the case from the jury.39
In Beta II, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.,40 the plaintiff’s Piper Navajo 
Chieftain disappeared in 1981.41 When the corporate owner of the plane filed 
an insurance claim, the insurer brought a declaratory judgment action in an 
unsuccessful attempt to avoid payment. According to the insurer, the owner’s 
lessee most likely stole the plane. 
Subsequently, the owner sued the insurer for bad faith. The trial court 
granted the insurer’s motion to dismiss, but the Ohio Court of Appeals 
37 Id. at 608-09 (footnote omitted). 
38  713 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1983). 
39 Id. at 1111 (footnote omitted). 
40  No. C-830779, 1984 WL 6951 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1984). 
41  The court’s opinion does not provide any further details about the disappearance. 
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reversed in a per curiam opinion. In addition to finding that subject matter 
jurisdiction existed and the declaratory judgment action did not bar the 
present suit, it held that H. Thomas McHenry, the owner’s sole shareholder, 
could seek individual damages: 
In the first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court 
erred in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss with respect to McHenry. 
We agree. Appellee alleges that McHenry fails to state a claim for relief 
because he is not a real party in interest. Appellee contends that because 
Beta (not McHenry) is the named insured on the contract, any action by 
McHenry must be brought as a shareholder, merely enforcing a right or 
obligation to the corporation. Appellee’s logic is faulty, however, 
because McHenry was personally liable on the promissory note to 
General Electric [the plane’s mortgagee] and was thus personally 
damaged by the alleged refusal to act in good faith. When the insurance 
claim was not paid, Beta was unable to meet its obligation on the note 
to General Electric and General Electric obtained a judgment against 
Beta and McHenry for $258,523.26 plus interest. McHenry directly 
suffered the consequences of appellee’s refusal to pay the insurance 
claim, and he is a real party in interest.42
In Royal Insurance Co. v. Ideal Mutual Insurance Co.,43 a Piper Navajo 
disappeared in 1981 while it was being transported from Pennsylvania to 
Tennessee, where a potential buyer was scheduled to see it. After paying the 
claim, the reinsurer sued the insurer, arguing that no coverage existed under 
the reinsurance agreement. In entering judgment for the insurer, Judge 
McGlynn of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded the pilot most 
likely had diverted the plane: 
Royal argues that a finding of conversion is precluded because there is 
no proof that [the pilot] Vincent intentionally exercised wrongful 
dominion or control over the Navajo given the pattern of prior dealings 
between Vincent and [the plane’s owner] Hortman, and there was no 
evidence of continued usage after the plane was lost. This argument is 
without merit. The fact that Vincent had rented the aircraft from 
Hortman on prior occasions and he had always returned the aircraft on 
these occasions does not establish that Vincent had permission to fly the 
Navajo to Miami in the situation at hand. It is undisputed that there was 
no discussion between Mrs. Hortman and Vincent regarding the use of 
the aircraft for any purpose other than the flight demonstration in 
Tennessee, and that there was no charge to Vincent or remuneration to 
42 Id. at *2. 
43  649 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d mem., 806 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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Hortman in connection with the flight. (J.S.F. 23, 24). 
Moreover, the fact that neither Vincent nor the Navajo has ever been 
located and that it is uncertain whether the plane was destroyed or 
Vincent continued to use it after its disappearance does not preclude a 
finding of conversion, because the conversion occurred simply by virtue 
of the fact that the aircraft was taken to Miami without the owner’s 
consent and never returned to the owner, thus depriving Hortman of its 
possessory rights in the plane. Even if Vincent intended to take the plane 
to Tennessee after he left Miami and it was somehow lost en route, a 
conversion has been made out because his use of the plane was 
inconsistent with the purpose for which he was given the aircraft.44
In United States v. Orozco,45 numerous individuals were charged with 
drug-related offenses. Denying their suppression motions, Judge Irving of the 
Southern District of California relied in part on a phone call about a missing 
airplane:
On September 18, 1984, [co-defendant Michael] Sullivan used his 
business phone to call Carlos [last name unknown]. Sullivan told Carlos 
that he was attempting to raise money and was looking for someone 
“who wanted to make a quick return on their dollar or get a part of what 
I am trying to bring in.” Carlos told Sullivan that he could not participate 
at this time and Sullivan asked if Carlos knew anyone who might like to 
participate. Carlos responded that the “four ones I knew were on that 
airplane that’s gone.” Carlos said the four guys that took off in the 
missing airplane had 1.5 million [dollars] which was lost. The FBI 
investigated this missing airplane and on September 20, 1984, Customs 
Special Agent Steve Trent advised [FBI Special] Agent [Charles] 
Walker that a confidential informant informed the Air Support Unit of 
Customs about a leased airplane which disappeared on August 29, 1984. 
The plane was leased from Palomar Airport on August 20, 1984 by four 
individuals, one of whom was Charles Eric Jenkins, a furloughed 
Western Airlines pilot. The individuals who leased this airplane filed a 
flight plan from San Diego to Houston, Texas, to Orlando, Florida and 
a possible stop in Canada. According to the FAA, the plane never made 
it to Houston. It has not been heard from since. The confidential source 
told Customs that the four individuals who leased the airplane were 
observed loading the airplane with food and money and that they were 
overheard saying their true destination was Mexico.46
In Rollins Burdick Hunter of New York, Inc. v. Euroclassics Limited, 
44 Ideal Mut., 649 F. Supp. at 137-38. 
45  630 F. Supp. 1418 (S.D. Cal. 1986). 
46 Id. at 1470-71. 
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Inc.,47 a twin-engine plane disappeared while in the Caribbean.48 When the 
plane’s corporate owner filed an insurance claim, the insurer refused to pay 
on the ground that the policy’s geographical limits had been breached. As a 
result, the owner sued the insurer for wrongfully denying the claim and the 
broker for procuring the wrong type of insurance. The trial court found for 
the insurer and against the broker. 
During discovery, the broker was stymied in its attempt to get answers 
from Jack Kartee, the owner’s president, who asserted the Fifth Amendment 
during his deposition. Subsequently, while testifying under a grant of 
immunity in an unrelated federal criminal case, Kartee admitted he had used 
the plane to smuggle drugs. As a result, the Florida District Court of Appeal, 
in an opinion by Judge Nesbitt, ordered a new trial: 
It is clear that the trial court’s denial of [broker] RBH’s motion was 
harmful error. On appeal, RBH relies primarily on its assertion that 
Kartee’s representation made at the time of application, that the plane 
would be used solely for pleasure trips, was a material misrepresentation 
which would have voided the policy. RBH claims, and the evidence 
supports the contention, that both RBH and [the insurer] Federal would 
have refused to contract with Kartee had he told them that he had been 
using the plane and planned to use it in the future for drug smuggling. 
Consequently, regardless of RBH’s alleged negligence, [the plane’s 
owner] Euroclassics would not have been entitled to insurance coverage 
because of Kartee’s misrepresentation. This affirmative defense is valid 
and would have exonerated RBH of liability if proven at trial.49
D.  Weather 
In Stewart v. Rogers,50 a Beech Bonanza disappeared during a 1953 
flight from Florida to North Carolina. The trial judge ruled that weather was 
to blame. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court, per Chief Justice 
Denny, agreed: 
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to have supported a finding 
that Worth Stewart died soon after he left Jacksonville, Florida, on 26 
February 1953, at approximately 11:40 a.m. He flew a small plane into 
weather conditions constituting a hazard to a pilot of his experience 
flying a plane equipped as his was; his intended path of flight would 
have carried him along the coast line for a considerable distance, at a 
time when the wind was of such velocity and direction as to blow him 
47  502 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
48  The court’s opinion does not provide the date of the plane’s disappearance. 
49 Id. at 962. 
50  133 S.E.2d 155 (N.C. 1963). 
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out to sea; and it has been determined that he did not land at or 
communicate with any airport within the flying range of his plane. The 
search for him was thorough and exhaustive. From these facts, the trial 
judge found that Worth Stewart was dead on 30 May 1956, over three 
years after his disappearance.51
E.  Pilot Error 
In Solomon v. Warren,52 a Cessna 337 Super Skymaster disappeared 
during a 1971 flight from Curacao to Barbados. After a bench trial, the district 
judge placed the blame on the pilot rather than the plane’s design. In 
affirming, the Fifth Circuit, per Judge Simpson, explained: 
On appeal the appellants contend that the appellee did not establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that Paul Warren was negligent in the 
planning of the trip and in the operation of the aircraft on July 23, 1971, 
and that Warren’s negligence proximately caused the Levins’ deaths. 
The argument goes that even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the appellee, the evidence at trial shows that there are two equally 
acceptable theories of the cause of the fatal crash: (1) the negligence of 
Warren and (2) the defect in the main fuel tank venting system in this 
model of aircraft. The appellants assert therefore that the appellee did 
not carry his burden of proof and that the district court erred in finding 
that Warren’s negligence was a proximate cause of the loss of the 
aircraft and the deaths of the Levins. 
This argument misconceives our appellate function . . . . [W]here the 
conclusions of the trial judge may reasonably be inferred from the 
record as a whole those conclusions will not be set aside on appeal, even 
though “conflicting inferences of equal reasonableness may be drawn 
from . . . the same body of evidence.” Here, after careful scrutiny of the 
record, . . . we find sufficient evidentiary support for that court’s 
conclusions as to liability.53
In Fleischman v. Department of Transportation, National 
Transportation Safety Board,54 a Cessna 210 made a “gear-up” landing 
during a 1986 flight that began and ended at an airport in Nevada. When the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated the incident, the 
plane’s owner admitted he had been at the controls. Later, however, he 
claimed that one of his passengers, a man named “George,” had been piloting 
51 Id. at 158-59. 
52  540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 545 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Warren v. Serody, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
53 Solomon, 540 F.2d at 784 (footnote omitted). 
54  927 F.2d 609, No. 89-70367, 1991 WL 26487 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 1991). 
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the airplane and had vanished immediately after the flight. Rejecting this 
story, the NTSB suspended the owner’s license for 40 days. On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit, in a memorandum opinion, affirmed: 
At the hearing Mr. Fleischman denied telling Inspector Morgan that he 
was [the] pilot-in-command when the plane was landed improperly. He 
testified that he had taken the plane out that day to show it to a potential 
purchaser, and that the potential purchaser, “George,” had been flying 
the plane during the relevant flight. Fleischman testified that he could 
not recall George’s last name; that George had an accent; that George 
was accompanied by a “friend that ran around with him all the time” 
whose name he could not recall at all; that George had been seen 
frequently around the airport for two years prior to the incident but never 
again afterwards; and that he did not know whether George or his friend 
had valid private pilot certificates, but that he had seen George fly many 
times. Mr. Fleischman also testified that he had been unable to locate 
George and did not know anyone else who knew him . . . . 
The petitioner contends that there is not substantial evidence in the 
record to support the ALJ’s and Board’s finding that he was the pilot-
in-command at the time of the gear-up landing. The petitioner was the 
owner of the plane and the only passenger in the aircraft known to be 
the holder of a pilot’s license. In addition, the ALJ found credible 
Inspector Morgan’s testimony that Mr. Fleischman admitted being the 
pilot-in-command of the flight when the inspector first questioned him 
following the landing. The inspector’s credibility was bolstered by his 
detailed account of Mr. Fleischman’s initial explanation of why he had 
forgotten to lower the landing gear. At the same time, Mr. Fleischman 
offered the highly implausible story that he turned the controls of his 
plane over to a man whose last name he did not know, whom he did not 
know to have a pilot’s license, and who has since vanished without a 
trace despite having frequented the airport prior to the incident. The 
ALJ, who had the opportunity to observe both witnesses’ demeanor, 
believed the inspector and found Mr. Fleischman’s version of the facts 
incredible. This circuit has recognized that the factual findings of the 
ALJ who heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the 
witnesses should be accorded great deference.55
F.  Res Ipsa Loquitur
Where it is impossible to say what caused a plane to disappear, both 
litigants and courts have relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.56
55 Id. at *1, *6 (footnote omitted). 
56 See generally Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Accidents, 25 
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In Haasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, Inc.,57 a plane disappeared 
during a 1948 flight from Alaska to Washington. Unable to pinpoint the 
reason, the plaintiffs relied on res ipsa loquitur. The defendant objected to 
the doctrine’s use but was rebuffed by Judge Folta of the District of Alaska: 
The plaintiffs, as personal representatives, seek to recover damages for 
the death of their decedents who were passengers on defendant’s 
airplane on a flight from Yakutat, Alaska, to Seattle, Washington, on 
November 4, 1948. The plane was last heard from in the vicinity of 
Sitka. No icing or storm conditions prevailed along this route at the time 
of this flight. No trace of the plane, its cargo or passengers has ever been 
found. The plaintiffs by appropriate allegations rely on the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur . . . . 
The question presented, therefore, is whether the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applies where the plane disappears during flight without a trace. 
The defendant’s contention that the doctrine is not applicable to a case 
such as this is based primarily on the ground that since the plane 
disappeared without a trace, the defendant can have no knowledge of 
the cause of the loss of the plane superior to that possessed by the 
A.L.R. 4th 1237 (1983 & Supp. 2015). Interestingly, Illustration 3 to comment e (“Permissible 
conclusions”) of § 328D of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) provided: 
A is a passenger in the airplane of B Company, a common carrier. In good flying weather the plane 
disappears, and no trace of it is ever found. There is no other evidence. Various explanations are 
possible, including mechanical failure which could not have been prevented by reasonable care, and 
bombs planted on the plane. It may, however, be inferred by the jury that the most probable 
explanation is some negligence on the part of B Company. 
While § 17 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
(2010) preserves the use of res ipsa loquitur in missing plane cases, its comment d (“Evidence about other 
possible causes”) rejects Illustration 3: 
The extent to which the plaintiff is required to offer evidence ruling out alternative explanations for 
the accident is an issue to which the Restatement Second of Torts provides an ambivalent response. 
In black letter, it states that res ipsa does not apply unless “other responsible causes” for the accident 
“are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence.” See Restatement Second, Torts § 328D(1)(b). Yet . . . 
the Restatement indicates that res ipsa applies when a plane disappears in good weather, even if the 
plaintiff introduces no evidence disproving mechanical failure or sabotage. See Illustration 3. . . . 
The tension between the Second Restatement’s black letter and the Second Restatement’s 
Illustrations are resolved in this Comment. Everything [now] depends on how strong the inference 
is of defendant negligence before evidence is introduced that diminishes the likelihood of any 
alternative causes. To present the matter quantitatively, if a type of accident is caused by defendant 
negligence 70 percent of the time, the plaintiff’s res ipsa case can proceed even without evidence 
from the plaintiff negating any of the remaining causes. But for another type of accident, defendant 
negligence may be implicated only 45 percent of the time; two other causes are 30 percent and 25 
percent possibilities. In such cases the plaintiff must offer evidence negating at least one of these 
causes in order to render the res ipsa claim acceptable. 
For a criticism of this new approach, see Daniel J. Pylmana, Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability Based Upon Naked Statistics Rather Than Real Evidence, 84 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 907 (2010). 
57  100 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1951). 
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plaintiffs. 
The rule precluding the application of the doctrine where the plaintiff’s 
knowledge is equal to that of the defendant is stated in 65 C.J.S., 
Negligence, § 220(5), page 1000 and 38 Am.Juris. 995, Section 299. An 
examination of the authorities cited in support of the rule however, 
discloses that it is applied to cases where the plaintiff has equal 
knowledge or where knowledge of the cause is equally accessible to the 
plaintiff—not to cases in which there is an equality of ignorance as in 
the instant case. Since inability, because of a lack of knowledge, to show 
specific acts of negligence is a prerequisite to the application of the 
doctrine itself, it follows that equality of knowledge precludes its 
application. But from this it does not follow that conversely equality of 
ignorance will likewise preclude applicability, for the function of the 
doctrine, as stated in the introduction to Shain’s Res Ipsa Loquitur, is to 
supply a fact, i.e. defendant’s negligence, which must have existed in 
the causal chain stretching from the act or omission by the defendant to 
the injury suffered by the plaintiff, but which the plaintiff because of 
circumstances surrounding the causal chain, cannot know and cannot 
prove to have actually existed. I conclude, therefore, that the rule barring 
the application of the doctrine where there is equality of knowledge is 
not applicable to the case at bar . . . . 
I am of the opinion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable 
and that the motion to dismiss should be denied . . . . Judgment may 
accordingly be entered for the plaintiffs.58
In Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp.,59 a small plane disappeared during 
a 1965 flight from the Bahamas to Puerto Rico. Lawsuits were brought 
58 Id. at 1-2. In Des Marais v. Thomas, 147 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff’d mem., 153 
N.Y.S.2d 532 (App. Div.), appeal and reargument denied, 153 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1956), a separate 
lawsuit brought by the plane’s owner against his insurer was dismissed due to the owner’s failure to 
comply with the policy’s conditions: 
It is not disputed that the first pilot on this fatal trip was neither of the two named pilots “approved 
by [the insurer] D. K. MacDonald and Company.” Plaintiff’s answer to the notice to admit, and the 
opposing affidavit herein, state that the first pilot actually had all the requisite qualifications stated 
in Endorsement No. 4 (this is not disputed by defendant) and “if a specific request had been made 
there would have been no valid basis for refusal by MacDonald.” It is thus conceded that his name 
was not even submitted to MacDonald. 
It is also not disputed that the co-pilot on this trip held only a student pilot certificate and did not 
possess the certificate or ratings required under the policy. Plaintiff’s answer and affidavit merely 
claim that he ‘exhibited’ to plaintiff ‘what appeared on its face to be a valid pilot’s airman certificate 
with proper ratings’ and had previously been employed as a full co-pilot by other air carriers. 
It is clear that in both respects there was a failure to comply with stated conditions of the policy . . . . 
My conclusion is that plaintiff has by his own neglect prevented a recovery under this policy. 
Des Marais, 147 N.Y.S.2d at 225-26. 
59  310 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 438 F.2d 1386 (3d 
Cir. 1971). 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 95 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 95 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
10 - JARVIS_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 6:38 PM
2015] Vanished Planes 537 
against the pilot’s estate and the company that owned the plane. In the 
absence of any firm proof as to why the plane disappeared, Judge 
Higginbotham of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded: 
The plaintiffs’ evidence establishes liability on the part of Theodore M. 
Hart’s estate. Since it was admitted that the airplane disappeared over 
the high seas, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of 
negligence in this case. Blument[h]al v. United States of America, 306 
F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962). Without an explanation of how the airplane 
crashed, I would hold that the negligence of the pilot, Theodore H. Hart, 
caused the accident. Since the ordinary rules of negligence apply to this 
suit, the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly shows that Mr. Hart’s 
negligence proximately caused the death of both young girls. The 
compelling inference from plaintiffs’ evidence is that the airplane 
crashed in adverse weather conditions for which the airplane was not 
properly equipped and for which the pilot was not properly trained. Mr. 
Hart had ample opportunity to appraise himself of the seriousness of the 
weather conditions for his small airplane, and he failed to do so. 
Furthermore, he was warned about the weather conditions before he 
attempted to fly from South Caicos to San Juan, Puerto Rico. His blatant 
disregard of these warnings demonstrates a flagrant breach of his duty 
to use reasonable care to protect his passengers. Such dereliction of duty 
caused the death of his daughter and her companion. 
Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof to establish liability 
against National Aircraft Corporation. There is no evidence that Mr. 
Hart was acting as National Aircraft Corporation’s agent or servant 
when the accident occurred. All of the evidence indicates that Mr. Hart 
had used the plane for a personal winter vacation trip. Plaintiffs’ counsel 
conceded in oral argument before this Court that he had failed to 
establish liability against National Aircraft Corporation on the theory of 
respondeat superior or on any other ground.60
III. CHOICE OF LAW/FORUM
Missing plane cases often require courts to make difficult choice of law 
or choice of forum determinations. 
In Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co.,61 the plaintiff’s brother was a 
passenger aboard the Hawaii Clipper, a Martin M-130 seaplane that 
disappeared in 1938 during a flight from Guam to the Philippines.62
60 Dugas, 310 F. Supp. at 26. 
61  1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
62  Although the court’s opinion does not mention the Hawaii Clipper by name, we know from 
other sources that Watson Choy was one of the plane’s passengers and that Frank Choy was his brother. 
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Uncertain which law governed his claim, the plaintiff brought five separate 
causes of action under, respectively, federal admiralty law; Nevada state law 
(Pan American’s place of incorporation); New York state law; international 
aviation law; and Filipino law. In a pre-trial opinion, Judge Clancy of the 
Southern District of New York dismissed the second, third, and fourth causes 
of action but put off choosing between the first and fifth causes of action: 
We conclude that the Death on the High Seas Act vests a right in this 
plaintiff to recover here and that that right may be asserted in this 
common law action. 
We can see no support for any claim plaintiff makes under the Nevada 
or New York statutes for neither can ever apply. The law of the place of 
wrong covers the right of action for wrongful death. Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws, sec. 391; Hunter vs. Derby Foods, Inc. (1940), 110 
F.(2d) 970 (2CCA). The Federal Act governs exclusively. Middleton vs. 
Luckenbach, 1934 A. M. C. 649, 70 F.(2d) 326 (2CCA). 
Nor do we think the claim under the Warsaw Convention should be 
insisted upon. There is no enabling act vesting the ownership of the 
cause of action stated by the Warsaw Convention nor even stating who 
may be thought to be injured by a death and, though the liability stated 
in Article 17 is part of the treaty which was adopted, we do not 
understand how it can be defined or enforced without statutory 
assistance, which it has not as yet received. 
Whether or not the Philippine law will determine the defendant’s 
liability rests upon a question of fact which only a trial can resolve.63
Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc.64 involved a different Hawaii 
Clipper passenger. Without discussing Choy, Justice Schreiber of the 
New York Supreme Court held that the ticket supplied the answer to the 
choice of law question: 
The rights of the parties are fixed by the rules for “International Air 
Transportation” established and concluded at Warsaw, Poland, on 
October 12, 1929, at a convention of nearly all governments, 
including the United States. Final adherence to this international 
treaty on the part of the United States was proclaimed by the 
President on October 29, 1934, 49 Statutes at Large, Part 2, p. 3000, 
See, e.g., Clipper Victim’s Kin Sues for $52,718, OAKLAND TRIB., July 4, 1940, at 4. 
63 Choy, 1941 A.M.C. at 487. Shortly after Judge Clancy’s decision, the parties settled for $4,000. 
It then was revealed that Watson Choy had been on a secret mission to deliver a large sum of cash to the 
Nationalist Chinese government. This money had been raised from Chinese-Americans and had been 
entrusted to Choy in his capacity as president of the Chinese War Relief Committee. See $250,000 Mystery 
of Chinese Closed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1941, at 7. 
64  43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff’d mem., 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 49 
N.Y.S.2d 271 (App. Div.), aff’d mem., 59 N.E.2d 785 (N.Y. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945). 
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which thus becomes part of the law of the land . . . . The said rules 
were made a condition of the ticket herein . . . .65
In Fornaris v. American Surety Co. of New York,66 a Cessna 182 
disappeared in 1957 while traveling from the U.S. Virgin Islands to Puerto 
Rico. It was agreed by all that the plane must have crashed somewhere 
between the two islands. This assumption, however, raised the question of 
whether the law of the Virgin Islands, the law of Puerto Rico, or the law of 
the United States was applicable. 
The defendants (the airplane’s corporate owner and its insurer) argued 
the law of the Virgin Islands, which capped damages at $10,000, should be 
used. Siding with the plaintiffs, the trial court opted for the law of Puerto 
Rico, which did not contain a cap, and ordered the defendants to pay 
$255,000.
On appeal, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Lord, affirmed. After first deciding that that case was not controlled by 
federal law (because the casualty almost certainly occurred in territorial 
waters), Justice Lord explained that under the “center-of-gravity test” Puerto 
Rico’s interests outweighed those of the Virgin Islands: 
From the above analysis it will be clear that Puerto Rico, and not St. 
Thomas, has the dominant contacts in this case . . . . The plane, the 
corporation that owns it, the four deceased passengers and their 
successors (here plaintiffs) were or are, as the case may be, of Puerto 
Rico. To them Puerto Rico owes the protection of its laws and its public 
policy. The crash site is a completely fortuitous factor and the fate of the 
parties in a rational system of law should not be left to the mercy of such 
a capricious factor. We therefore adopt the doctrine of the key contacts 
which we find is more realistic and fair and apply the law of Puerto 
Rico.67
Three different choice of law/forum decisions owe their existence to 
Flight 739, a chartered Lockheed L-1049H that disappeared in 1962 while 
transporting 93 U.S. soldiers from California to Viet Nam.68
In Pardonnet v. Flying Tiger, Inc.,69 the administrator of one of the 
soldiers’ estates sued the airline in federal court in Illinois. After entering a 
65 Wyman, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 422. 
66  93 D.P.R. 29, No. R-63-296, 1966 WL 16541 (P.R. Jan. 24, 1966). 
67 Id. at *10 (author’s trans.). 
68  The families currently are campaigning to have the soldiers’ names added to the Viet Nam 
memorial in Washington, D.C. See Matthew M. Burke, Listing on Vietnam Wall Sought for Troops Killed 
in 1962 Plane Crash, STARS AND STRIPES, July 24, 2013, http://www.stripes.com/news/listing-on-
vietnam-wall-sought-for-troops-killed-in-1962-plane-crash-1.231996. 
69  233 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Ill. 1964). 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 96 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 96 Side B      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
10 - JARVIS_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 6:38 PM
540 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:519 
special appearance, the airline moved to have the case transferred to 
California. In support of its motion, it argued that the action was governed by 
the Warsaw Convention and, as such, suit had to be brought in one of the four 
forums specified by Article 28(1) of the treaty: the airline’s domicile 
(Delaware), the airline’s principal place of business (California), the location 
where the ticket was issued (California), or the intended destination (Viet 
Nam).70 In denying this request, Judge Decker of the Northern District of 
Illinois wrote: 
In conclusion, assuming only for the purposes of respondent’s exception 
to the jurisdiction of this Court, that the Warsaw Convention does apply 
to this case, Article 28(1) determines only which nations can hear the 
case, but not which court within an appropriate nation. Article 28(2), by 
leaving questions of procedure to the court to which the case is 
submitted, would determine which court within an appropriate nation 
may hear a case. Under the domestic jurisdiction and venue statutes of 
the United States, the libel in personam in the case at bar is properly 
filed in the Northern District of Illinois, and this Court properly has 
jurisdiction and venue of the subject matter and parties.71
In Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,72 the administrators of four other 
passenger estates sued the airline in California. The district court, noting the 
soldiers had been issued tickets incorporating the Warsaw Convention, held 
the airline was entitled to limit its liability. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, per 
Judge Hamley, agreed the treaty was applicable but ruled the airline was not 
entitled to limitation: 
Under the facts of the case before us, the passenger tickets were 
delivered at the foot of the ramp just as the servicemen boarded the 
plane. None of the passengers were afforded a reasonable opportunity 
of even reading the ticket, much less obtaining additional insurance, 
before they were accepted by boarding the plane. The passengers were 
thereby deprived of a right which was intended to be afforded them 
[under the treaty] as a concomitant to the carrier’s right to limit its 
liability.73
Lastly, in Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy,74 the pilot’s family was 
70  Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air art. 
28 § 1, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11. For a further discussion, see Note, Article 28 of the 
Warsaw Convention: A Suggested Analysis, 50 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1966). 
71 Pardonnet, 233 F. Supp. at 688. 
72  234 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. Cal. 1964), rev’d, 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965). 
73 Warren, 352 F.2d at 498. 
74  250 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Cal. 1965), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 370 F.2d 46 (9th Cir. 1966). 
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awarded death benefits under California’s workers’ compensation statute75 at 
a rate of $70 per week for 250 weeks, or $17,500. After agreeing to, and 
receiving, a lump sum payment of $16,819.91, the family sought death 
benefits under the federal Defense Base Act (DBA).76 A deputy 
commissioner granted the family $68.25 a week for as long as they met the 
DBA’s age and dependency requirements and gave the airline a credit for 
what it already had paid. When the airline sued the deputy commissioner to 
set aside his award, the district court dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit, per Judge Ely, held the airline should have received a credit of 
$17,500 rather than $16,819.91 but otherwise affirmed: 
Although the record on this appeal does not contain a transcript of the 
entire proceedings before the California Industrial Accident 
Commission, the referee’s award is before us. It does not include a 
specific finding that the federal Defense Base Act is inapplicable, and 
the appellants concede in their briefs that the issue of federal jurisdiction 
was never raised before the state body . . . . 
There is more weight to appellants’ contention that the applicants, by 
seeking and recovering benefits under the state act, made a binding 
election of remedies . . . . But the coverage provisions of the Defense 
Base Act clearly evidence the intent that the act shall afford the sole 
remedy for injuries or death suffered by employees in the course of 
employments which fall within its scope . . . . [Thus,] the Deputy 
Commissioner had jurisdiction to render the disputed award . . . .77
In Kelley v. Central National Bank of Richmond,78 a Piper aircraft 
disappeared during a 1969 flight from Florida to Virginia. The passenger’s 
estate sued the pilot’s estate in federal court on the basis of admiralty 
jurisdiction.79 The pilot’s estate objected because there was no proof the 
plane had ended up in the ocean. 
After considering the matter, Judge Lewis of the Eastern District of 
Virginia held that admiralty jurisdiction existed because wreckage from what 
might have been the plane was briefly spotted off the coast: 
The missing aircraft was last reported to be some ten miles SSE of Vero 
Beach en route to Richmond, Virginia. 
A member of a [civil air patrol] search crew spotted submerged objects 
about twenty-four hundred yards off shore east of Melbourne Beach in 
about forty feet of water. This observer thought the submerged objects 
75  Cal. Labor Code §§ 3200-6208. 
76  42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1654. 
77 Landy, 370 F.2d at 51-52 (footnote omitted). 
78  345 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
79  28 U.S.C. § 1333. 
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were parts of the missing airplane they were then looking for—He 
described what he saw in some detail—The searching aircraft circled 
the spot for some time and radioed for a Coast Guard vessel to come to 
the scene. 
The cutter did not reach the scene until the next morning—The divers 
could not enter the water due to the presence of sharks—A marker buoy 
was placed on the spot and arrangements were made for a Navy diving 
team to embark with the cutter on Sunday. 
High winds causing sixteen-foot seas washed the marker buoy away—
preventing the cutter from sending divers down until the following 
Thursday—by then the submerged objects could not be found. 
No other aircraft was reported missing in the area in question. It does 
not follow from the fact that the submerged objects were never 
recovered that they were not there. 
The Court concludes from the evidence presented that the objects seen 
beneath the surface of the ocean off Melbourne Beach in the navigable 
waters of Florida were the remains of the aircraft in question.80
In American Home Assurance Co. v. United States,81 a 1972 flight 
disappeared between New Jersey and New York. The plaintiff argued that 
federal court jurisdiction existed under both the Federal Torts Claim Act 
(FTCA)82 and the Suits in Admiralty Act.83 In disagreeing with the latter 
contention, Judge Muir of the Middle District of Pennsylvania wrote: 
The Government does not contest our jurisdiction under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act. However, it has filed a motion to dismiss with respect to 
our alleged jurisdiction under the Suits in Admiralty Act. 
Disposition of this motion is completely controlled by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 
249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972). That case held that the mere 
fact that an alleged wrong takes place or has its effect on or over 
navigable waters is not by itself sufficient to turn an aviation tort case 
into a “maritime tort.” Rather, for such a case to be cognizable in 
admiralty, the alleged wrong must bear a significant relationship to 
“traditional maritime activity” . . . . 
Combining the Supreme Court’s limited view of admiralty jurisdiction 
in aviation tort cases with a conclusion that no “traditional maritime 
activity” has been demonstrated here, this Court holds that the instant 
suit is not cognizable under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Consequently, 
80 Kelley, 345 F. Supp. at 739-40. 
81  389 F. Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1975). 
82  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 
83  46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (now codified as 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901-30918). 
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the Defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to jurisdiction under 46 
U.S.C. § 741 et seq. will be granted.84
In Bazor v. Grasso Production Management, Inc.,85 a helicopter ferrying 
workers between oilrigs in the Gulf of Mexico disappeared during a 2005 
flight. The ex-wife of one of the workers, acting on behalf of his children, 
sued numerous parties.86 Although all sides agreed that the helicopter must 
have crashed, there was sharp disagreement regarding the exact location, 
which would determine whether Louisiana state law or federal admiralty law 
applied.
In an effort to resolve this critical issue, Magistrate Judge Shushan 
permitted the plaintiffs to take extensive discovery: 
Industrial Helicopters urges that the pilots do not possess information 
relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses. This is disputed by the 
plaintiffs. For example, they contend that the helicopter went down 
further than twelve miles from shore while Industrial Helicopters will 
urge the helicopter went down within the twelve mile limit. Plaintiffs 
contend that, if the helicopter went down beyond the twelve mile limit, 
they may recover non-pecuniary damages . . . . 
The circumstances of the action are unusual. The helicopter, its pilot and 
the two men on the platform were lost without a trace. Industrial 
Helicopters’ search and rescue efforts are relevant to the plaintiffs’ 
claims. Six or seven of the pilots may have participated in those efforts 
and possess information on those efforts. There is no basis to depose the 
pilots who did not participate in the search and rescue efforts and, to the 
extent these pilots possess information on subjects like company 
procedures, [their] testimony is redundant and cumulative. 
The depositions of eight pilots were noticed. Industrial Helicopters shall 
produce those pilots who participated in the search and rescue efforts. 
Its motion to quash is granted as to any of the eight pilots that did not 
participate in the search and rescue efforts.87
IV. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
To be timely, death actions must be filed within the applicable statute of 
limitations (SOL). But when does the SOL begin to run in a missing plane 
case? There are at least five possibilities: 1) the flight’s departure date; 2) the 
84 American Home, 389 F. Supp. at 658. 
85  2007 WL 1560303 (E.D. May 25, 2007). 
86  Among the defendants was the owner of the rig from which the helicopter had departed. In an 
earlier decision, its motion to be let out of the lawsuit had been denied as premature. See Bazor ex rel.
Lantier v. Grasso Prod. Mgt., Inc., 2007 WL 625846 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2007). 
87 Bazor, 2007 WL 1560303, at *1-2. 
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flight’s scheduled arrival date; 3) when it first becomes obvious that 
something has gone wrong; 4) when rescue efforts are called off; and 5) the 
day a specific participant is declared legally dead. Depending on the 
circumstances, the time between these events can be very short or quite 
long.88
In Storey v. Garrett Corp.,89 a DC-4 disappeared on March 28, 1964, en 
route from Hawaii to California. By March 24, 1966, the estates of three of 
the passengers had filed lawsuits against the plane’s operator. On January 16, 
1967, these actions were consolidated before Judge Hauk of the Central 
District of California. 
Thereafter, the plaintiffs, asserting that a recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decision90 had abolished the “exclusive remedy provision” of the DBA, 
sought to add Facilities Management Corporation (FMC), the passengers’ 
employer, as an additional defendant. In upholding FMC’s objection based 
on the expiration of the two-year SOL applicable to maritime torts,91 Judge 
Hauk wrote: 
On March 28, 1966, the two-year period of limitation following the 
occurrence upon which these libels are based, expired. 46 U.S.C. § 763. 
Since that date, any claim these plaintiffs may have against FMC, and 
their remedy thereon, has been barred as a matter of law. It was not until 
almost 14 months after this bar had been raised that the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in the Jackson case. Whatever the meaning of 
that decision, it cannot reasonably be held to have revived a cause of 
action which had been extinguished by lapse of the statute of limitations 
prior to the date of its entry . . . . 
Plaintiffs seek to avoid the effect of the foregoing rule by reliance on 
the “relation back” doctrine of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Such reliance cannot be justified. It has long been recognized 
that the “relation back” doctrine does not enable a plaintiff to join 
entirely new parties as defendants after the statute of limitations has 
run.92
In Carman v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,93 a pilot of a small 
airplane disappeared during a 1970 flight.94 In 1971, when his wife sought to 
88  For an early treatment of this problem, see Note, Presumption—Evidence of Death—Doctrine 
of Specific Peril—Disappearances After Airplane Crashes, 9 AIR L. REV. 79 (1938). 
89  43 F.R.D. 301 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 
90  Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731 (1967). 
91  46 U.S.C. § 763(a) (now codified as 46 U.S.C. § 30106). As explained infra text accompanying 
note 105, the SOL for maritime torts was increased to three years in 1980. 
92 Storey, 43 F.R.D. at 303-04. 
93  748 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1988). 
94  The court’s opinion provides no further information about the plane or the flight. 
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collect on his life insurance policy, his insurer informed her that she had to 
wait until he had been missing for seven years. In 1985, an Alaska probate 
court declared the pilot dead and fixed his date of death as 1975. The wife 
then applied again to the insurer for payment but was told her claim was time-
barred. The trial court agreed. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court, per 
Chief Justice Rabinowitz, affirmed: 
The statute of limitations for actions on contracts is six years. AS 
09.10.050(1). The probate master concluded that Mr. Carman was 
presumed to have died on or about August 7, 1975, five years from the 
date of his disappearance. Thus, because Mrs. Carman did not file her 
complaint until April 8, 1985, the statute of limitations had run and her 
claim was untimely. No injustice results from enforcement of the 
limitations period here, particularly since Mrs. Carman has offered no 
excuse for waiting until 1985 to make her claim despite being informed 
by Prudential that she could do so in 1977.95
In Scharwenka v. Cryogenics Management, Inc.,96 a pilot disappeared 
while flying his employer’s Cessna 310J from New Jersey to Massachusetts. 
The trip took place on September 9, 1972; on April 12, 1973, a Massachusetts 
probate court declared the pilot dead. 
On February 25, 1975, the pilot’s widow and infant son filed for New 
Jersey workers’ compensation benefits. Measuring the state’s two-year SOL 
from the time of the plane’s disappearance, the employer opposed their 
claims. The New Jersey Division of Workers’ Compensation agreed with the 
employer, as did Judge Conford of the New Jersey Superior Court’s 
Appellate Division: 
Although petitioner has not overtly contended that the discovery rule . . . 
justifies giving her relief in this situation, she seems impliedly to so aver 
in arguing that the “acquisition of the enforceable right” did not in this 
case occur until entry of the Probate Court decree. That contention lacks 
cogency. The time of procurement of the decree was purely 
adventitious. It could have been delayed indefinitely. The statutory 
criterion of the time of the accident cannot be displaced by the vagaries 
of the occasion selected by decedent’s next of kin to procure an 
95 Id. at 745. Justice Matthews, believing the claim was timely, dissented: 
Mrs. Carman would be presumed to have made a demand at the expiration of the six-year limitations 
period which began when death was presumed, August 7, 1975. Thus, the date of the presumed 
demand would be August 7, 1981. That demand would be deemed immediately refused and the 
statute of limitations would begin to run from August 7, 1981. Since the present action was brought 
on August 7, 1985, it would not be barred. 
Id. at 746. 
96  394 A.2d 137 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
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adjudication of death for entirely disparate purposes. 
Furthermore, assuming, but not deciding, that the discovery rule is at all 
applicable . . . the facts at hand would not bespeak relief for petitioner. 
As already indicated, petitioner either knew or reasonably should have 
known, well before a date two years prior to the filing of her claim, the 
existence of facts equatable with a compensation cause of action for 
accidental death . . . . 
Petitioner [also] argues that the limitation period should be tolled as to 
her infant son until majority . . . . To the extent that we understand the 
contention, we find it without merit. Tort actions, death actions, and 
workers’ compensation proceedings, are sufficiently distinctive in 
purpose, function and effect to rationally warrant legislative 
differentiation in respect of limitation provisions, including the 
incidence of tolling vel non.97
In Weiss v. United States,98 a Grumman airplane disappeared during a 
July 12, 1982, flight from New York to Massachusetts.99 On July 30, 1986, 
the pilot’s executor filed a lawsuit under the FTCA.100 Based on the FTCA’s 
two-year SOL,101 the government moved to dismiss. In response, the executor 
argued the SOL did not begin to run until December 18, 1985, the date on 
which a New York surrogate’s court declared the pilot legally dead. After 
considering matters, Judge Constantino of the Eastern District of New York 
found the suit time-barred: 
[W]hen coupled with painstaking efforts to find the plane, the 
conclusion must be reached that the plane was in fact the victim of some 
unfortunate catastrophe. In view of this fact, this court must . . . assume 
that the decedent met with his death on July 12, 1982. 
Since the claim for wrongful death arose on July 12, 1982 . . . the last 
possible date which the plaintiff could have brought this action would 
have been July 12, 1984. Plaintiff failed to give any reasons to the court 
for his delay in presenting his petition before the Surrogate’s Court. 
Although the court is aware that the period of limitation may seem 
arbitrary, the court has no authority to extend or narrow the period of 
limitations . . . . The statute of limitations of the F.T.C.A. is a valid 
defense to this action and therefore this court grants defendant’s 
97 Id. at 139-40. 
98  No. CV-86-3548, 1987 WL 15267 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 1987). 
99  This is the same flight that gave rise to Mooney. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
100  According to the complaint, “the decedent’s death was caused by the negligence of Air Traffic 
Controllers who are employees of the Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.).” Weiss, 1987 WL 15267, 
at *1. 
101  28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 
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12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.102
In Phillips v. Heine,103 the plaintiff’s son disappeared on March 21, 
1987, during a flight in a Piper Cherokee from Malta to Italy.104 On February 
26, 1990, a California state court declared him legally dead. On December 
12, 1990, the plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit against the pilot’s conservator 
in the District of Columbia. The defendant successfully moved for dismissal 
due to the three-year SOL for maritime tort actions. On appeal, the District 
of Columbia Circuit, per Judge Williams, affirmed: 
In this case, the date of death was indisputably on or about March 21, 
1987, the date upon which the plane disappeared; hence the cause of 
action accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, on that date. 
In the absence of some congressional intent to the contrary, federal 
statutes of limitation are subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling, 
which shelters the plaintiff from the statute of limitations in cases where 
strict application would be inequitable . . . . Appellant invokes the 
doctrine, saying that the statute should have been tolled to account for 
the delay until a conservator had been appointed for the pilot and Brian 
Phillips had been declared legally dead. 
We assume for the purposes of this case that the absence of a conservator 
for the pilot and of a declaration of death for plaintiff’s decedent were 
circumstances justifying tolling. We also assume that the time appellant 
spent until February 26, 1990, the date upon which the California court 
declared Brian Phillips dead, was reasonable in order to establish his 
death. It does not follow, however, that appellant was entitled to three 
years from that date to bring the action . . . . 
Here the justifications for delay, viewed in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff, ended no later than the California court’s certificate of 
February 26, 1990. The statute, without any tolling, did not expire until 
March 21, 1990. As nothing had prevented plaintiff from gathering 
information in the preceding years, and more than three weeks 
remained, we question whether there was any need to extend the statute 
at all. But plaintiff’s reasonable needs surely did not require extending 
the time the full nine and one-half months that passed before he filed 
suit on December 12, 1990. We note that the prior version of the statute, 
46 U.S.C. app. § 763 (repealed Pub. L. No. 96-382, Oct. 6, 1980), 
provided for explicit tolling, but extended the period for only 90 days 
after the end of the tolling event. When Congress extended the statutory 
period from two years to three and deleted any reference to tolling, we 
102 Weiss, 1987 WL 15267, at *2. 
103  984 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 905 (1993). 
104 Mynatt v. Heine, Civ. a. No. 89-0748(OG), 1991 WL 45734, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 1991). 
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doubt it meant to allow plaintiffs more than 90 days from correction of 
the tolling event, at least in the absence of some extraordinary factor that 
would make so long an extension reasonable.105
In Hopper v. Dependable Life Insurance Co.,106 a crop duster 
disappeared during a February 1980 flight from Florida to Colombia.107 In 
September 1988, a probate court found that the presumptive date of death 
was February 6, 1980. Following this ruling, the wife sued to collect on her 
husband’s life insurance policy. The underwriter moved to have the case 
dismissed as untimely, arguing that it should have been brought by February 
1985. The trial court agreed but the appeals court reversed. In its view, the 
statute of limitations did not begin to run until the husband had been missing 
for the entire statutory period, which in Florida is five years. As a result, the 
wife had until February 1990 to sue: 
Since Mrs. Hopper brought her action within five years of the accrual of 
her cause of action, the statute of limitations did not bar the action. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that the cause of action was 
barred because of the date of death selected by the probate judge.108
V. CLAIMS
When the occupants of a plane go missing, a host of relational rights are 
implicated. Depending on what is at stake, the resulting claims-wrangling 
may be limited to family members or include such third parties as the 
government, unions, and insurance companies. 
A.  Intra-Family Matters 
1.  Spouses 
In Chiaramonte v. Chiaramonte,109 a couple’s 1978 divorce decree 
required the ex-husband to pay $100 a week in alimony and child support. 
After he disappeared on a 1980 flight from the Bahamas to Florida, his ex-
wife sought an order requiring him to keep paying her (so as to be able to 
attach his assets). In ruling that no further payments were due, Justice Spatt 
of the New York Supreme Court explained: 
In general, a provision in a judgment in a matrimonial action for alimony 
does not survive the death of the husband; and upon the husband’s death, 
105 Phillips, 984 F.2d at 491-92 (footnote omitted). 
106  615 So. 2d 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
107  The court provides no further information about the flight. 
108 Id. at 264. 
109  435 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1981). 
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the obligation for support and maintenance ceases and may not be 
enforced. Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408, 75 N.E. 236 (1905); 
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 42 A.D.2d 590, 345 N.Y.S.2d 73 (2d Dept. 
1973); Enos v. Enos, 41 A.D.2d 642, 340 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dept. 
1973).110
In In re Estate of Pringle,111 a pilot disappeared during a 1996 flight 
from the U.S. Virgin Islands to Dominica. After he was declared dead, his 
ex-wife, insisting their 1980 divorce was a sham, sought a share of his estate. 
In rejecting her claim, Judge Steele of the U.S. Virgin Islands Territorial 
Court wrote: 
Even if the Petitioner’s allegations of deception were accepted as true, 
the Court would still find that she was barred from receiving a 
distributive share of the Decedent’s Estate pursuant to 15 V.I.C. § 
87(2) . . . . [T]he Petitioner voluntarily chose to appear in the divorce 
action. In fact, the Dominican Republic divorce was obtained by 
utilizing a procedure where both parties mutually consented to the 
action. The mere presence of the Petitioner at the Consul General’s 
office is a sufficient act in furtherance of the divorce. More damaging is 
the testimony elicited from the Petitioner herself. She admitted to lying 
to the Office of the Consulate General in order to obtain the divorce. It 
is abundantly clear to the Court that such an affirmative act was 
conducted to assist in the procurement of the divorce. No matter which 
party initiated the proceedings, each played an active role in the 
procurement. An absence of participation from either party would have 
frustrated the Dominican Republic action. As such, the Court holds that 
both the Petitioner and the Decedent procured the divorce decree. The 
fact that neither individual was physically present in the Dominican 
Republic is of no consequence.112
2.  Children 
In In re Walsh’s Estate,113 a couple disappeared during a 1948 flight 
over the jungles of British Guiana. They left behind two sons: Michael, a 
three-year-old who had been living with them in British Guiana, and George, 
a five-year-old who they had placed in a Texas institution because of his 
disabilities. In accordance with the husband’s will, Michael went to live with 
his paternal grandmother in California. George, on the other hand, remained 
institutionalized.
110 Id. at 525. 
111  2000 WL 1349231 (V.I. Terr. Ct. July 25, 2000). 
112 Id. at *6. 
113  223 P.2d 322 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950). 
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Subsequently, the boys’ maternal grandmother sought to be named their 
guardian. After the trial court dismissed her petition regarding George for 
lack of jurisdiction, it granted her petition regarding Michael. When the 
paternal grandmother appealed, the California District Court of Appeal 
affirmed: 
We may not reject the findings of the trial court and substitute contrary 
findings. There is evidence that would have supported contrary findings. 
That the trier of fact rejected that evidence does not impeach the 
soundness of his conclusions. We do not have the opportunity of seeing 
and hearing the parties and the witnesses or of applying any of the tests 
by which the propriety of appointing one or the other of the parties may 
be determined. Appellant “has failed to establish any greater grievance 
here than she might in any case where the evidence would support a 
conclusion either way but where the trial court has decided it to weigh 
more heavily for the opposite party. Such a choice between two 
permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not error.” Riesenberg 
v. Riesenberg, 97 Cal.App.2d 714, 218 P.2d 577, 578.114
B.  Extra-Family Matters 
1.  Social Security Benefits 
Social Security benefits are available after a person has not been seen or 
heard from for seven years.115 In Autrey v. Harris,116 the plaintiff’s ex-
husband disappeared in 1969 while piloting a small plane from Kansas to 
Nevada. In 1970, the plaintiff applied for surviving child benefits but was 
turned down by the Social Security Administration (SSA) on the ground her 
request was premature. In 1976, she reapplied and was turned down again, 
this time because the SSA felt her ex-husband’s disappearance was not 
“unexplained.” The district court upheld the SSA’s decision in a one-page 
order. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed in a per curiam opinion: 
The administrative law judge [accepted the government’s contention 
that the ex-husband simply ran away based on]: (1) Fisher’s failure to 
file federal income tax returns in 1967, 1968 and 1969; (2) a suggestion 
that he was trying to avoid child support payments; and (3) several 
random comments by the [plaintiff] and her children that there may have 
been minor family difficulties. 
114 Id. at 326. 
115  20 C.F.R. § 404.721(b). This period can be shortened as the facts dictate. See id. (“[W]e will 
use as the person’s date of death either the date he or she left home, the date ending the 7 year period, or 
some other date depending upon what the evidence shows is the most likely date of death.”). 
116  639 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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Plainly, these are not sufficient to satisfy the Secretary’s rebuttal burden, 
and are not enough to justify a conclusion that Fisher engineered a 
phony disappearance in order to change his identity. The burden of the 
Secretary requires more than mere conjecture as to possible 
explanations . . . . Here, the Secretary did no more than present facts 
which hardly support a somewhat bizarre and certainly speculative 
conclusion. The judgment of the district court must be reversed, and 
remanded with directions to enter a contrary judgment in favor of the 
appellant.117
In Brewster on Behalf of Keller v. Sullivan,118 the Eighth Circuit faced 
facts similar to those in Autrey. In 1980, the plaintiff’s husband was supposed 
to fly his employer’s DC-3 from San Antonio, Texas, where it had been 
undergoing modifications, back to California. Instead, after purchasing 800 
gallons of fuel, the plane took off from Waco, Texas, and was never seen 
again.
The plaintiff soon learned that the police had her husband under 
investigation for drug smuggling and a stolen company credit card had been 
used to pay for the 800 gallons of fuel. She also discovered that during the 
two weeks before he disappeared, her husband had been seen in Waco with 
another man. 
A search of the husband’s locker at work yielded a grenade as well as a 
birth certificate and a driver’s license with fake names. According to 
witnesses, on several occasions the husband had talked about wanting “to 
chuck it all and move to Costa Rica.” 
A confidential informant then reported the plane had crashed while en 
route to Barranquilla, Colombia. When contacted, the U.S. consulate 
confirmed that a DC-3 with two bodies had gone down near the town. 
Although the plaintiff forwarded her husband’s dental records, a positive 
match could not be made. 
In 1981 and again in 1984, the SSA denied the plaintiff’s request for 
benefits for the couple’s two children. In 1987, she applied a third time. After 
granting this application, the SSA reopened the file and reversed itself, a 
decision upheld by the district court. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit, per Senior 
Circuit Judge Henley, reversed: 
In this case, the Secretary argues that he has rebutted the presumption 
of death by providing “facts” that explain Keller’s “disappearance in a 
manner consistent with continued life.” The Secretary notes that Keller 
was under investigation for drug smuggling and had stolen an airplane 
117 Id. at 1235 (footnote omitted). 
118  972 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1992). 
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and credit card. He also notes that a grenade and fictitious identification 
were found in Keller’s possessions in California and further notes 
Keller’s statements expressing a desire to live in Costa Rica. 
We disagree that these “facts” are sufficient to rebut the presumption 
that Keller is dead. As Brewster points out, the record reveals no 
evidence that Keller was aware of the drug investigation or had taken 
other fictitious identification to Texas. Nor does the record indicate that 
criminal charges had ever been filed in connection with the alleged theft 
of the airplane and credit card . . . . 
We also believe little weight should be given to Keller’s statements that 
he wanted to “chuck it all and move to Costa Rica.” See Autrey v. Harris,
639 F.2d at 1235 (failure to file income tax returns coupled with random 
comments regarding marital difficulties insufficient to overcome 
presumption). Moreover, we find the Secretary’s scenario which has 
Keller blowing up the airplane with two occupants in order to engineer 
“a phony disappearance . . . a somewhat bizarre and certainly 
speculative conclusion.” See id.
Our review of the applicable caselaw provides further support for our 
conclusion that in this case the Secretary has failed to rebut the 
presumption of death. See Wages v. Schweiker, 659 F.2d 59 (5th 
Cir.1981) (wage earner’s disappearance after receiving spousal support 
order and withdrawal of funds from bank account insufficient to rebut 
presumption); Johnson v. Califano, 607 F.2d [1178,] at 1178 [(6th 
Cir.1979)] (evidence of wage earner’s severe marital and career 
difficulties insufficient to rebut presumption); Edwards v. Califano, 619 
F.2d [865,] at 865 [(10th Cir.1980)] (evidence that wage earner was 
alive four years after abandoning family insufficient); Secretary v. 
Meza, 368 F.2d [389,] at 389 [(9th Cir.1966)] (evidence suggesting that 
wage earner was attempting to avoid child support payments 
insufficient).
We note there are cases in which courts have found that the Secretary 
had produced sufficient evidence to rebut a presumption of death, see,
e.g., Mando v. Secretary, 737 F.2d [278,] at 280 [(2d Cir.1984)] 
(husband disappeared one week before sentencing on gun conviction, 
after telling his wife “that he might go away for a long time”); Brown v. 
Heckler, 723 F.2d 1135, 1137-38 (3d Cir.1983) (husband disappeared 
and later wrote wife that he was leaving country and had changed his 
name and identification), but we find them distinguishable. 
We further note that in this case, unlike many unexplained 
disappearances, we believe there is strong circumstantial evidence that 
Keller is dead. A DC-3 airplane with two bodies, which were burned 
beyond recognition, had crashed near Barranquilla, South America, 
which was where a confidential informant had advised the police the 
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airplane could be found and corroborates the information Brewster had 
heard and reported in May 1980. 
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the 
district court with instructions to remand to the Secretary for an award 
of children’s benefits.119
In Perez-Sordo v. Heckler,120 the plaintiff’s husband disappeared in 
1978 while piloting an Aerocommander from Liberia, Costa Rica, to San 
Jose, Costa Rica. In 1979, she sought survivors’ benefits on behalf of herself 
and her children. The SSA twice denied her claim for lack of sufficient proof. 
When the plaintiff took the SSA to court, Magistrate Judge Shapiro 
concluded the SSA’s decision should be reversed: 
In the instant case, a thorough review of the record establishes that 
substantial evidence of death exists and there is no substantial evidence 
upon which the Secretary can base a finding that the wage earner is not 
dead. The probate court heard evidence, made extensive findings, and 
determined that plaintiff had died. The insurance companies paid out 
large sums of money in reliance upon Perez-Sordo’s death. The wives 
of the lost men [Perez-Sordo and co-pilot Roberto Hernandez] 
conducted their own investigation, and both testified to their 
conversations and findings. These were corroborated by documentation 
in the file[,] which established that Perez-Sordo had been hired to fly 
the plane, had taken off, had issued a distress, and had never returned. 
Both wives stated that there was simply no reason for either man to 
disappear. Each had had no marital or financial problems. No one has 
ever seen either man since. It appears to this Court to be most unnatural 
for Alberto Perez-Sordo to have completely abandoned not only his wife 
but his three children. Similarly for the other occupant of the plane, 
Roberto Hernandez, as to his daughter and two step-sons and two 
children by a prior marriage (T. 340). The only evidence which even 
hints at the continued survival of the men is the FAA note regarding 
possible CIA involvement. Though Social Security took this message in 
a phone contact, there is no follow-up at all on it, nor is there any 
mention by anyone else of such involvement. The wives also reported a 
mysterious call, but the caller stated that the men were returning which 
they never did. This can hardly be said to constitute “substantial 
evidence . . . .” 
Alberto Perez-Sordo was expected back for the Christmas holidays and 
had asked his wife, Maggie Perez-Sordo, to wait for his arrival to put up 
119 Id. at 902-04 (footnotes omitted). Believing the case should have been remanded for further 
proceedings before the SSA, Judge Hansen dissented. See id. at 904. 
120  No. 82-1134-CIV-CA, 1984 WL 145983 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 1984). 
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their Christmas tree; also, Mrs. Perez-Sordo had given her husband a list 
of gifts to purchase in San Jose, Costa Rica . . . . The absence of the 
wage earner cannot be deemed to be considered unexplained. A plane 
flew off into the wild blue yonder. There is no evidence to show that it 
returned. The occupants never returned and have not been heard from. 
They were lost in the depths of the sea. For all these reasons, the decision 
of the Secretary must be reversed as unsupported by “substantial 
evidence.” See Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 970-71 (11th 
Cir.1982).121
In Duthu v. Sullivan,122 the plaintiff’s ex-husband disappeared during a 
1979 flight to Venezuela.123 In 1980, she contacted her local SSA office and 
inquired about applying for benefits. On that occasion, as well as several 
subsequent ones, she was told that without proof of her ex-husband’s death 
she would have to wait seven years. In actuality, the SSA’s regulations on 
this point are quite flexible,124 a fact the plaintiff eventually learned on her 
own. Accordingly, in 1985 she submitted written applications on behalf of 
James and Kelly, the couple’s two children. 
The SSA ruled that James was eligible for benefits but only from 1985 
onwards. As for Kelly, it determined she had “aged out” and therefore was 
not entitled to any benefits. After these decisions were upheld by the SSA’s 
Appeals Council, the plaintiff took the government to court but lost. On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit, per Judge Gee, affirmed: 
We cannot escape the fact, however, that Mrs. Duthu did not file a 
written application for benefits until December 1985. Although her 
failure to file the application is explained by the SSA employees’ 
erroneous statements to the effect that filing would be futile and a waste 
of time, there is no contention here that the SSA actually refused a 
specific request to make a written application, which conduct might 
have constituted the sort of affirmative misconduct required for 
assertion of the doctrine of estoppel. As sympathetic as we are to Mrs. 
Duthu’s position, we find that the blunders of the SSA employees . . . 
were simply not of the character to overcome the well-established 
rule . . . that a government employee’s misinformation and ineptitude 
will not estop the government from requiring a written application for 
benefits.125
121 Id. at *4. The district court subsequently accepted Judge Shapiro’s recommendation. See id. at 
*1.
122  886 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990). 
123  The court’s opinion does not indicate the trip’s starting point. 
124 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
125 Duthu, 886 F.2d at 100. 
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In McKee v. Sullivan,126 the plaintiff’s husband and a friend flew from 
Georgia to Florida to go fishing. On January 14, 1985, while returning home, 
their Cessna disappeared off the coast of Jacksonville. A week-long search 
turned up no trace of either the plane or the men. An NTSB report regarding 
the loss referred to the plane as “presumed destroyed” and the occupants as 
“presumed dead.” 
On January 24, 1986, the plaintiff filed a petition for a declaration of 
death in a Georgia probate court. On August 7, 1986, she was granted letters 
of administration. On August 13, 1986, she applied for survivors’ benefits 
for herself and her children. 
The SSA denied the applications on the basis that there was no proof 
that the plaintiff’s husband was dead. After this decision was upheld by the 
SSA’s Appeals Council and the district court, the plaintiff appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in an opinion by Judge Anderson: 
20 C.F.R. § 404.720(c) provides: 
(c) Other evidence of death. If you cannot obtain the preferred evidence 
of a person’s death, you will be asked to explain why and to give us 
other convincing evidence such as: the signed statements of two or more 
people with personal knowledge of the death, giving the place, date, and 
cause of death. 
Directing our attention to the example provided, the Secretary argues 
that this regulation requires direct evidence of death. Mrs. McKee 
argues that the example does not foreclose the consideration of other 
evidence such as the probate court decision and the NTSB report. 
From a reading of the plain language of the regulation, we conclude that 
the district court and the ALJ erred in not considering the probate court 
decision and the NTSB report. We agree with Mrs. McKee that the 
example provided in the regulation is merely illustrative and does not 
preclude the consideration of other evidence. The plain meaning of the 
term “other convincing evidence” includes any available evidence, 
either direct or circumstantial . . . . The Secretary’s argument that the 
regulation only provides for direct evidence does violence to both the 
plain meaning of the regulation and to common sense.127
2.  Pension Payments 
In Estate of Kowalski v. Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund,128 a 
retired steelworker disappeared in 1999 while flying his private plane from 
Iron County, Michigan to Oakland County, Michigan. In 2000, his family 
126  903 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1990). 
127 Id. at 1438-39 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). 
128  No. 07-11014, 2008 WL 375208 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2008). 
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sought to have him declared legally dead, but the Iron County probate court 
deemed the request premature. In 2005, the family submitted a new petition, 
which was granted and fixed the date of death as February 9, 2005. 
Upon his retirement in 1993, the decedent had begun collecting a union 
pension. After he disappeared, this money stopped. As a result, in 2005 the 
family requested 62 months of back checks. When the union refused to pay, 
the family took it to court. Magistrate Judge Whalen of the Eastern District 
of Michigan concluded the suit should be dismissed: 
Given the rebuttable statutory presumption and the non-conclusive 
nature of the death certificate, the question is whether the Fund had 
rational grounds to find that Mr. Kowalski’s death occurred not on 
February 9, 2005, but on or about November 12, 1999, when his plane 
disappeared . . . . 
In the present case, there is clear evidence that well before February 9, 
2005, Mr. Kowalski encountered a specific peril that might reasonably 
be expected to have caused his death. His plane took off on November 
12, 1999, and was never heard from again. It did not land in Oakland 
County, his intended destination. As the probate judge noted, this is 
circumstantial evidence of a fatal accident. Moreover, Mr. Kowalski’s 
family—the personal representatives of the estate, and presumably 
rational people—believed that he was dead, since they sought 
permission to open an estate in early 2000. 
Under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, the Fund need 
only “articulat[e] a rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.” Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 
1989). It did so when it denied the benefits claimed by Mr. Kowalski’s 
estate. Furthermore, contrary to the Plaintiff’s argument, the final denial 
(AR 1-3) clearly considered and took into account the 2005 Probate 
Court opinion, and articulated a rational and legally correct reason for 
rejecting it.129
3.  Insurance Proceeds 
In Barringer v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,130 a soldier 
disappeared in 1943 while flying from Puerto Rico to Trinidad in an Army 
C-47. When his wife sought to collect on his life insurance policy, the insurer 
argued the policy’s “aviation rider” had been triggered. Under this provision, 
if the insured died while riding in an airplane the payout would be reduced 
from the policy’s face value to its net reserve. 
In an attempt to avoid the clause, the wife insisted there was no proof 
129 Id. at *3-4. The district court accepted Judge Whalen’s recommendation. See id. at *1. 
130  62 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff’d mem., 153 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1946). 
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the insured had died while riding in an airplane. Judge Kilpatrick of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania made short work of this argument: 
Various more or less fantastic explanations of disappearance of plane 
and passengers might be suggested but, with practically no land on the 
direct route to Trinidad, I do not see how there could be much doubt in 
the mind of any reasonable person that it came down in the sea. At any 
rate it is not necessary to preclude all other possibilities. 
If the plane fell into the sea then, again, the reasonable, probable and 
almost necessary conclusion, from the nature of the accident, is that the 
insured’s death resulted from riding in an airplane. Again, there are 
possible theories which might account for his death otherwise as, for 
example, gunfire from a German submarine, but they are remote. 
Certainly, if it be taken as established that, having been riding in an 
airplane which fell into the sea and was lost with all on board, the 
insured is dead, it seems to me that it is not only permissible but 
reasonable and logical to conclude that he met his death as a result of 
riding in the airplane.131
The flight in Barringer also gave rise to Smith v. Massachusetts Mutual 
Life Insurance Co.132 This time, the airman’s wife sought to avoid the 
aviation rider by keeping his two policies in force until he could be declared 
legally dead on the basis of prolonged absence (as opposed to perishing in an 
airplane). In permitting this strategy (and thereby reversing the trial court), 
the Fifth Circuit, per Judge Sibley, observed: 
The appellee puts forward, as the reasons why it should be given a 
declaratory judgment now, that Mrs. Smith is tendering the indebtedness 
against the policies and if the tender is accepted the reserves will 
automatically carry the premiums till February, 1950, more than seven 
years from the insured’s death (meaning his disappearance), and if said 
payment is accepted, or if any premiums are accepted, it will likely estop 
it to claim the aircraft provision, to its irreparable damage. By 
amendment it was further alleged that appellee might lose its evidence 
or its witnesses might disappear. None of these fears are weighty. Surely 
the acceptance without conditions of a debt due on the policy would not 
prejudice the Company. It is entitled to this payment in any event. It 
need not accept premiums if it fears an estoppel therefrom. None are 
now offered or need be till after the seven years. The policies will simply 
be in suspense, as life policies normally are till death is established. The 
trial has demonstrated that the Company has no evidence save the War 
131 Barringer, 62 F. Supp. at 288. 
132  167 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 167 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 830 
(1948).
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Department records, and no oral testimony of importance. This 
testimony is now preserved by this trial should these witnesses die. On 
Mrs. Smith’s side, she may acquire important evidence. Her husband is 
not yet known to be dead nor so presumed by any law binding on her. 
She may learn that her husband, if dead, did not die by reason of the 
airplane trip, but survived it and died from other causes. She ought not 
to be hurried into a res judicata now, when it is known she cannot answer 
the circumstances which do indicate death from riding in an airplane, 
but not at all conclusively. We are of opinion that on a just balance of 
inconveniences there is no need now for a declaratory judgment, and 
that the complaint should be dismissed without prejudice, at the cost of 
appellee.133
Barringer was distinguished in Boye v. United States Life Insurance 
Co.134 The insured’s B-17 disappeared during a 1944 bombing run from 
England to Germany. When the beneficiaries of his life insurance policy 
sought to collect, the insurer invoked the aviation rider. The trial court found 
for the insurer, but the District of Columbia Circuit, per Judge Edgerton, 
reversed:
The exclusion clause in [this] suit is headed “Aviation Exclusion.” If 
Lieutenant Boye’s death resulted directly or indirectly from gunfire, as 
the District Court thought and we think it probably did, we think it 
resulted from a risk of war that the policy did not exclude and not from 
a risk of aviation that the policy did exclude. We think the case is much 
the same as if the policy had excluded death “due to operating or riding 
in an automobile” and the insured had been killed by gunfire while 
driving an army car. 
In Knouse v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 163 Kan. 213, 181 P.2d 
310, 311, on which appellee relies, . . . the insured was not killed by 
gunfire but by jumping from a bomber whose gasoline supply had run 
out during a mission. Recovery on the policy was of course denied. In 
Barringer v. Prudential Ins. Co., D.C., 62 F.Supp. 286, affirmed 3 Cir., 
153 F.2d 224, the exclusion clause was like the one before us but the 
event was rather like the one in the Knouse case. An army airplane 
carrying the insured disappeared between Puerto Rico and Trinidad. The 
court duly [in]ferred that it fell into the sea, and accordingly denied 
recovery. The court said in effect that it would have allowed recovery if 
there had been reason to believe that an enemy submarine had shot the 
133 Smith, 167 F.2d at 991-92. Several years later, the insurance company filed a new declaratory 
action and lost again. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 193 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1951), reh’g
denied, 194 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1952). 
134  168 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 828 (1948). 
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plane down.135
In Heikes v. New York Life Insurance Co.,136 a U.S. Navy pilot 
disappeared during a 1943 training flight off the coast of Florida. Two years 
earlier, he had taken out a $2,500 life insurance policy with the defendant 
that included a double indemnity provision. When his wife submitted a claim, 
the insurer refused to pay due to the policy’s aviation rider and war risk 
clause. Alleging mistake and fraud, the wife sued the insurer but the trial 
court dismissed her complaint. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit, per Judge 
Sanborn, affirmed: 
The plaintiff in the instant case, we think, has completely failed to prove 
that the insured made a different contract than that which was expressed 
in the policy. 
The inaccurate statement made by the agent of the insurer, more than a 
year after the policy was issued, to the effect that its coverage was 
subject to no restrictions, is, in our opinion, of no help to the plaintiff. 
There was no evidence that the insured was actually misled by this 
statement, and, since he was charged with knowledge of the terms of his 
policy, he could not reasonabl[y] be held to have been deceived. The 
agent was probably referring to the policy as a straight life policy and 
did not have in mind its double indemnity feature. The only effect that 
the misstatement of the agent could possibly have had was to induce the 
insured to keep the policy in force until the time of his death. Had the 
insured failed to do so, the plaintiff could have recovered nothing from 
the insurer.137
In Wadsworth v. New York Life Insurance Co.,138 a U.S. Air Force pilot 
stationed in Japan disappeared during a 1951 combat mission. Several 
months earlier, while on bereavement leave in the United States, he had filled 
out an application for a general life insurance policy. When his wife sought 
to collect, the insurer told her that it had declined the application and instead 
made a counter-offer that would have added an aviation rider and a war 
exclusion clause to the policy. In the resulting lawsuit, the trial judge found 
for the insurer but the Michigan Supreme Court, per Justice Edwards, vacated 
the judgment and remanded for a new trial: 
Reviewing the record of this case, we can think of few circumstances in 
life where the unvarnished truth and prompt decision were more clearly 
called for than in the solicitation and processing of Captain 
135 Boye, 168 F.2d at 570-71. 
136  171 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1948). 
137 Id. at 463. 
138  84 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. 1957). 
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Wadsworth’s application for life insurance. Sympathy for his widow 
should not occasion court imposition of a life insurance contract which 
is not justified by the actions of the parties themselves. But neither 
should judicial recoil from sentiment occasion our forgetting that 
Michigan law imposes on life insurance companies twin duties of use of 
language which is clear and understandable to laymen and reasonable 
promptness in acceptance or rejection of the risk . . . .139
In Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Commander,140 a plane 
made a forced water landing during a July 8, 1953, trip from Boston, 
Massachusetts to Provincetown, Massachusetts. The plaintiff’s husband, who 
was a passenger aboard the flight, disappeared in the mishap and was never 
seen again. On September 1, 1953, the plaintiff, having traveled from the 
couple’s home in Virginia to Provincetown, where she conducted her own 
search and concluded her husband most likely died from drowning, sought to 
collect on an insurance policy he had brought from an airport vending 
machine. Insisting it had not received timely notice of the accident, the 
insurer declined to pay. The trial court rejected this defense. On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit, per Judge Dobie, affirmed: 
It is quite clear that notice of the accident was not given within the 
specific 20 days set out both in the Virginia Statute and in the policy, 
extended to conform with this Statute. The question then arises whether 
notice was given, under the provisions of the policy and the Virginia 
Statute, as soon after the accident as was “reasonably possible.” 
The District Judge stated: “I have found as a fact that, under the 
circumstances, the notice was given as soon as was reasonably 
possible.” This finding of fact we can overturn only if we hold that it is 
clearly erroneous. We cannot so hold. The circumstances of this case, 
set out in detail earlier in this opinion, make up a peculiar and distinctive 
pattern. Under that pattern, we must sustain this factual finding of the 
District Court.141
In Griffith v. Continental Casualty Co.,142 the insured, a Delta Air Lines 
pilot, disappeared in 1975 while flying his personal Beechcraft from Texas 
to Florida. When his father sought to collect on his Delta group life insurance 
policy, the request was rejected. Citing the policy’s “air coverage” clause, the 
insurer argued it was not liable because, at the time of his disappearance, the 
insured had been neither an airplane passenger nor working as a Delta flight 
139 Id. at 519-20. Justice Sharpe, believing the insurer had properly rejected the application, 
dissented. See id. at 520. 
140  135 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Va. 1955), aff’d, 231 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1956). 
141 Commander, 231 F.2d at 352-53. 
142  506 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
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crew member. 
Although the plaintiff conceded the second point, he insisted that a 
“pilot,” a fortiori, also is a “passenger.” Judge Sanders of the Northern 
District of Texas found otherwise: 
Plaintiff contends that if Griffith did indeed die while riding in an 
aircraft, his death was covered under Part VIII, the “Air Coverage” 
provision. Under this provision, the insured was covered while “riding 
as a passenger in any aircraft properly licensed to carry passengers and 
while Insured Employee is operating or performing duties as a crew 
member of any aircraft owned, leased or operated by [Delta] . . . .” 
Plaintiff asserts that the coverage afforded in the first instance in this 
provision encompasses Griffith’s death; to this end he espouses an 
interpretation of the phrase, “riding as a passenger” which includes a 
pilot within its scope . . . . 
The facts clearly indicate and the Court finds that Lee R. Griffith was 
piloting his plane when it left the Dallas airport. Consequently, the Court 
concludes that he was not riding as a passenger at the time of his 
disappearance, and that his disappearance was not covered within the 
“Air Coverage” provision of the policy. It follows that Exclusion (5) in 
Part IX applies and that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover on the 
policy.143
In Severson v. Severson’s Estate,144 a physician and his wife disappeared 
in 1978 while the wife was flying the couple in their personal plane from 
Homer, Alaska to Anchorage, Alaska. The husband’s estate subsequently 
sued the wife’s estate for wrongful death. When it later attempted to add the 
wife’s insurer as a defendant, the insurer objected on the ground that Alaskan 
law bars direct action suits against liability insurers. The Alaska Supreme 
Court, per Justice Burke, agreed: 
We are aware of only two states which allow a direct cause of action 
against a tortfeasor’s insurer, Louisiana and Wisconsin. In those states, 
however, such actions are expressly authorized by statute . . . . 
Elsewhere, the common law rule of no direct liability prevails. Dean 
Prosser explains that rule as follows: 
Since, in its inception, liability insurance was intended solely for 
the benefit and protection of the insured, which is to say the 
tortfeasor, it followed that the injured plaintiff, who was not a party 
to the contract, had at common law no direct remedy against the 
insurance company. 
143 Id. at 1336-37. 
144  627 P.2d 649 (Alaska 1981). 
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Prosser on Torts, § 82 at 544 (4th ed. 1971). 
Despite petitioner’s argument, we are not persuaded that we should 
recognize a direct cause of action against the insurer in the case at bar. 
AS 01.10.010 provides: “So much of the common law not inconsistent 
with the Constitution of the State of Alaska or the Constitution of the 
United States or with any law passed by the legislature of the State of 
Alaska is the rule of decision in this state.” As noted, the common law 
on this subject is clear and overwhelmingly contrary to the rule urged 
by petitioner.145
In Compass Insurance Co. v. Palm Beach Lakes Aircraft, Inc.,146 a 
corporate-owned plane disappeared in 1978. In a sworn statement before 
trial, one of the company’s officers claimed he accidentally crashed the plane 
into the ocean. Shortly after making this statement, the officer disappeared. 
The trial judge rejected the officer’s story but found that coverage 
existed under the plane’s insurance policy. On appeal, the Florida District 
Court of Appeal, per Judge Beranek, agreed with the trial judge’s first 
conclusion but not his second: 
At a non-jury trial, the trial judge announced that he did not believe the 
evidence that the plane had been crashed into the ocean. This evidence 
was severely impeached and indeed plaintiff concedes it was perfectly 
proper for the trial court to disbelieve it. Notwithstanding rejection of 
the plaintiff’s evidence regarding a crash, the court apparently 
concluded there was coverage because the plane had in fact 
disappeared . . . . 
We reverse. The [policy] . . . applied to the aircraft while in motion. In 
the instant case, there was absolutely no proof which was accepted by 
the trial court that anything happened to the aircraft while in motion . . . . 
Here, at best, plaintiff proved that the whereabouts of the plane were 
unknown. In the absence of proof of takeoff or that the plane was in 
motion, plaintiff simply failed to prove a risk within the coverage . . . .147
The holding in Compass was relied on in Congleton v. National Union 
Fire Insurance Co.148 In 1980, a couple’s plane disappeared from a 
Tennessee airport. The insurer, suspecting fraud, disclaimed coverage. When 
the couple sued, the insurer successfully moved for summary judgment. On 
appeal, the California Court of Appeal, per Associate Justice Arguelles, 
affirmed: 
145 Id. at 651 (footnote and citation omitted). 
146  399 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
147 Id. at 518 (citations omitted). 
148  234 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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Unable to show that a theft actually occurred—or even that someone 
wrongfully took possession—appellants essentially urge an 
interpretation of “disappearance” that is synonymous with a mere 
inability to locate the aircraft. Such an interpretation would be in clear 
derogation of an express policy definition of “disappearance,” a term 
used in an insuring clause rather than in an exclusionary clause. 
Additionally, in a similar case, where an insuring clause in an aviation 
policy purported to cover “All Risks While In Motion” and contained 
language similar to that in appellants’ policy here, the court held that, 
“In the absence of proof of takeoff or that the plane was in motion, 
plaintiff simply failed to prove a risk within the coverage stated 
above . . . .” (Compass Ins. Co. v. Palm Beach Lakes, etc. (Fla. App. 
1981) 399 So. 2d 517, 518.) Application of this interpretation is 
particularly compelling here because the aircraft was reported missing 
within a few weeks after the policy was procured, and appellants 
apparently made no showing of what efforts, if any, they undertook on 
their own to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
mysterious disappearance of a plane they had recently purchased for 
almost a quarter of a million dollars and immediately leased and then 
subleased to people already under investigation for both drug smuggling 
and similar mysterious disappearances of other aircraft . . . . Appellants’ 
immediate submission of their claim to respondents under these 
circumstances could be said to reasonably raise respondents’ eyebrows 
in considering the claim. 
Accordingly, we find that appellants’ failure to sustain their burden of 
producing evidence of their aircraft’s “disappearance” so as to invoke 
coverage under the policy entitled respondents reasonably to deny 
coverage under the circumstances presented here.149
In J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc.,150 the plaintiff 
leased one of its planes to the defendant. When it disappeared, possibly as a 
result of theft, the plaintiff filed a claim with its insurer.151 After collecting 
$600,000, the plaintiff, contending that its losses totaled $1.25 million, sued 
the defendant for the remaining $650,000. The defendant moved to dismiss 
on the ground the plaintiff lacked standing. The trial judge granted the 
motion, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge 
Greene, reversed and remanded: 
Plaintiff’s status as partial assignor and a real party in interest turns on 
the disputed factual extent of plaintiff’s entire loss, which includes those 
149 Id. at 223-24. 
150  362 S.E.2d 812 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). 
151  The court’s opinion provides no further details about the plane’s disappearance. 
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losses neither covered by nor compensated under plaintiff’s insurance 
contract with Insurer. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s summary 
judgment dismissing plaintiff’s claims for lack of a real party in interest 
and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.152
In Benjamin v. AIG Insurance Co. of Puerto Rico,153 an Esso employee 
disappeared in 1994 while piloting an airplane.154 After his minor son 
collected nearly $74,000 in group life insurance proceeds, the child’s court-
appointed guardian sued Esso and its insurance company, claiming that an 
additional $26,000 was due. The trial court dismissed on the basis that the 
suit was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA).155 On appeal, the guardian for the first time argued that 
ERISA was inapplicable. Finding that the issue had been waived, the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court, per Associate Justice Cabret, affirmed the trial court: 
Benjamin begins her Appellant’s brief with three arguments: (1) that the 
Superior Court’s order granting the motion to dismiss based on the 
affirmative defense of preemption was improper, because affirmative 
defenses cannot be the basis of a grant of a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings; (2) that Esso is not the kind of entity that can raise an ERISA 
defense; and (3) that the claims in the complaint are not the kind of 
claims preempted by ERISA. However, Benjamin never raised these 
arguments to the Superior Court in her opposition to the motion to 
dismiss, or in any subsequent filings, and, in fact, raises them for the 
first time on appeal. Generally, we consider all arguments made for the 
first time on appeal in civil cases as waived unless the party offering the 
argument presents exceptional circumstances . . . . Benjamin has not 
presented us with any exceptional circumstances to warrant deviation 
from this general rule for any of her first three arguments. Therefore, we 
consider these arguments waived and do not reach their merits. 
As her fourth argument, Benjamin argues that the Superior Court 
impermissibly determined that the life insurance documents attached to 
the complaint made up an ERISA plan . . . . We note that, unlike all three 
152 Id. at 822. Although he concurred in the result, Judge Phillips did not join the majority because 
he felt the record was sufficiently complete: 
[N]o further findings are necessary because the materials before the court clearly establish that 
plaintiff assigned to its insurance company only that part of its indivisible claim that the insurance 
company paid for, and thus plaintiff is still a necessary party to the action and the insurance company 
can be joined at the motion of either party. 
Id. at 823. 
153  56 V.I. 558, S. Ct. Civ. No. 2010-0025, 2012 WL 1353527 (V.I. Apr. 12, 2012). 
154  The court’s opinion provides no further details about the flight. 
155  29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. 
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of the previous arguments, Benjamin made a similar argument to the 
Superior Court . . . . However, while the error may have been correctly 
preserved for consideration before this Court, Benjamin failed to bring 
up this argument in her original appellate brief, and instead waited until 
the reply brief to raise this issue. When an argument is raised for the first 
time on appeal in a reply brief, that argument is deemed waived because 
the appellee will not get an opportunity to respond to the 
argument . . . .156
VI. JUDGMENTS
If a missing flight results in a judgment for one litigant, may others rely 
on it? In Ayala v. Airborne Transport, Inc.,157 a case involving a twin-motor 
plane that disappeared during a 1948 trip from Puerto Rico to Florida, a panel 
of New York State appellate judges answered “no”: 
The issues in both cases may be identical. However, before the judgment 
in the first case will operate as an estoppel in the second case, the 
plaintiffs must also establish that this action is “between the same parties 
or their privies,” Rudd v. Cornell, 171 N.Y. 114, 127, 63 N.E. 823, 827. 
Of course, plaintiffs in this case were not parties and took no part in 
[the] action [brought by Mulligan, the Public Administrator, on behalf 
of a passenger named Perez]. Also, if the verdict in the latter case had 
been in favor of the defendant, the present plaintiffs, not having had an 
opportunity to be heard, would not have been bound by the consequent 
judgment. The plaintiffs therefore cannot establish mutuality of 
estoppel, nor is there any showing of privity, derivative or dependent 
liability . . . . 
The present plaintiffs[, who represent four other passengers], by dint of 
the fact that they were once linked as co-plaintiffs in the same complaint 
with the Public Administrator, have tried to weave some ambiguous web 
of unity with him. A reading of the complaint, however, discloses that 
there is no privity, nor any relationship akin to privity, among the five 
original plaintiffs. Furthermore, the order of severance provided not 
only that the severed actions be tried separately, but that “judgment may 
be entered in the severed cause of action and the causes of action 
remaining herein separately and independently of each other * * *.”158
156 Benjamin, 2012 WL 1353527, at *4. 
157  124 N.Y.S.2d 561 (App. Div. 1953). 
158 Id. at 562-63. The Ayala plaintiffs were seeking to use Mulligan v. Airborne Transport, Inc., 
113 N.E.2d 148 (N.Y. 1953). The facts in Mulligan, which, of course, also are the facts in Ayala, are 
reported at 305 N.Y. 743 (1953). 
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In Brown v. Estate of Jonz,159 a plane disappeared during a 1972 flight 
from Anchorage, Alaska to Juneau, Alaska. The passenger’s wife, on behalf 
of herself, the couple’s biological daughter, and her three children from a 
previous marriage, sued the pilot’s estate. Because the trial court instructed 
the jury that the passenger’s stepchildren were excluded from recovery, only 
the wife and daughter were awarded damages. When the wife appealed this 
instruction, the Alaska Supreme Court, per Justice Burke, affirmed: 
Appellant in this case made no objection relating to the exclusion of the 
McDaniel children, although the trial court asked, in reference to 
Instruction 35, “Do you have any objection to that instruction?” 
Appellant originally submitted sixteen proposed instructions and later 
submitted two “supplemental proposed jury instructions,” but none of 
these instructions dealt with the issue appellant seeks to raise in this 
appeal . . . . 
In addition to asking explicitly whether appellant had objections to the 
instructions, the trial court had previously invited appellant to brief the 
issue of whether stepchildren could recover under the [Alaska] 
Wrongful Death Act. Appellant submitted no brief to the trial court in 
response to that request. The trial court might therefore have concluded 
that appellant had abandoned the issue . . . . 
Although appellant made no objection at trial, we could still consider 
her contention, if the instruction given constituted plain error . . . . 
Because of the lack of precision in the language of the Wrongful Death 
Act, AS 09.55.580, the status of stepchildren as potential beneficiaries 
is not clear, but we do not find that the superior court’s ruling excluding 
the McDaniel children from recovery was plainly erroneous, and 
therefore we do not review the court’s instruction on this issue.160
If any money is paid to a missing person’s estate, is it available to his or 
her creditors? In Matter of Estate of Pushruk,161 the Alaska Supreme Court, 
per Chief Justice Boochever, said “yes” in a case arising from a 1975 flight:162
Having established that Mrs. Mogg [the missing passenger’s mother and 
sole heir] is not entitled to recover as a statutory beneficiary, we 
159  591 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1979). 
160 Id. at 534-35 (internal citations omitted). Chief Justice Boochever, believing the statute clearly 
included stepchildren, dissented. See id. at 536. 
161  562 P.2d 329 (Alaska 1977). 
162  The court’s opinion contains only one sentence regarding the trip: “Donney Pushruk was a 
passenger in a Channel Flying, Inc. airplane which disappeared during a flight on January 13, 1975.” Id.
at 330. Other sources, however, reveal that the plane was a DeHavilland DHC-2 air taxi that went missing 
while flying from Tenakee, Alaska to Juneau, Alaska with a pilot and four passengers. See, e.g., NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, Jan 1975 Aviation Accidents, http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/
ntsb.aviation/brief.aspx?ev_id=46534&key=0 (under the first entry for “Monday, January 13, 1975”). 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 110 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 110 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
10 - JARVIS_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 6:38 PM
2015] Vanished Planes 567 
conclude that according to the statute, the proceeds of the wrongful 
death action pass directly into the [passenger’s] estate. We therefore 
proceed to consider the question of the rights of creditors in this context. 
Since AS 09.55.580 provides that recovery on behalf of the estate shall 
be “administered as other personal property of the deceased”, this issue 
must be resolved as a problem of ordinary estate administration. 
Personal property of the deceased is clearly subject to the valid claims 
of creditors. AS 13.16.460 et seq. provide detailed and explicit 
procedures for presentation, allowance and payment of claims against 
the estate. Nothing in the chapter exempts estates consisting in whole or 
in part of a wrongful death recovery. 
The estate suggests that if the proceeds of a wrongful death action are 
subject to the claims of creditors in cases where there are no statutory 
beneficiaries, then “any person, including the State of Alaska and 
creditors of the deceased person, could institute a wrongful death action 
on behalf of the deceased person.” Under the statute, however, only the 
personal representative may institute an action. It is true that under some 
circumstances the action might benefit only the estate’s creditors, but 
we do not find this result necessarily inconsistent with the legislative 
scheme.163
VII. TAXES
Just as the taxman plagues the living and the dead, so he afflicts the 
presumed dead. 
In In re Thornburg’s Estate,164 a U.S. Navy pilot, flying a Vega Ventura 
bomber, disappeared in 1944 while on combat patrol in the Philippines. Six 
months later, his father died. Six months after the father’s death, the Navy 
changed the son’s status from MIA to deceased. 
When the father’s will was probated, the county court, concluding that 
the father had died first, assessed $324.51 in state inheritance taxes. In so 
holding, it rejected the state treasurer’s argument that the son had died first 
and that his widow (the father’s daughter-in-law) was the actual legatee and 
owed an additional $5,416.79 in taxes. 
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Lusk, reversed: 
[T]he question here is whether the arbitrary presumptive date of death, 
fixed by Congress and found by the Navy Department, must give way 
to facts which to a reasonable mind establish with convincing force an 
actual earlier date of death. Conceding to the Department’s finding the 
full force to which it is entitled, we think its prima facie effect has been 
163 Pushruk, 562 P.2d at 332-33 (internal citations omitted). 
164  208 P.2d 349 (Or. 1949). 
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overcome.165
In Harrison v. Commissioner,166 a couple boarded their private plane in 
1993 for a trip from Utah to California but never arrived. Both of their wills 
presumed survival by the other spouse and transferred to the survivor a life 
estate. The executor valued each life estate on the basis of actuarial tables 
and claimed a credit of $16,457 for each spouse. The Internal Revenue 
Service disallowed these calculations on the ground that the life estates had 
no value. When the executor appealed, Judge Nims of the Tax Court upheld 
the government’s position: 
[A]n underlying rationale for deeming valueless life estates transferred 
upon simultaneous deaths is that a willing buyer with knowledge of all 
relevant facts would pay nothing for the interest. Here such a buyer 
would be aware either of an airplane crash and consequent near 
simultaneous deaths or, at minimum, of some misfortune that left one or 
both spouses stranded in an area apparently so remote that not even a 
possible crash site was found for many months. In both scenarios, we 
believe that a buyer so informed would have realized the high 
probability that any survival would be brief and, accordingly, would 
have declined to pay anything for the life estates at issue. 
Moreover, the record before us reflects probate orders and death 
registrations presuming identical April 1, 1994, dates of death and 
finding it “more probable than not” that the Harrisons died as a result of 
an aircraft crash en route to their destination. In [the] absence of any 
evidence that might suggest a period of survival by either spouse, we 
find it incongruous to accept the presumed April 1 dates of death for all 
other estate tax purposes while at the same time rejecting the rationale 
underlying such presumptions.167
165 Id. at 355. 
166  115 T.C. 161 (2000). 
167 Id. at 171-72. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing makes clear, many of the legal issues that can arise 
when a plane goes missing already have received judicial consideration. 
Some, however, are still waiting for their day in court. Among the most 
intriguing is what happens if a pilot or a passenger, having been declared 
dead, later is discovered to be alive.168
168  This possibility, of course, provides the plot for the movie Cast Away (Twentieth Century Fox 
2000), which stars Tom Hanks as a FedEx employee who returns home four years after a plane crash to 
find that his wife has remarried. The film is a modern retelling of Lord Tennyson’s well-known poem 
Enoch Arden (1864), which concerns a mariner who suffers a similar fate. Some jurisdictions have enacted 
so-called Enoch Arden laws to protect the remarried spouse from bigamy charges. See Brewster, 972 F.2d 
at 902 n.4. 
